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I. STATUS
A. UNISEXUAL UNIONS
OLLOWING the decision of the Hawaiian Supreme Court' that
Hawaii's prohibition against granting persons of the same sex a li-
cense to marry may violate the equal protection provision of the
Hawaiian constitution, it has been suggested that Texas should enact a
statute making it plain that same-sex marriages entered into elsewhere by
Texas domiciliaries (or persons who may become Texas domiciliaries) are
against Texas public policy and will not be recognized here.2 About
twenty other states have adopted statutes which grant recognition to mar-
riages entered into in other American jurisdictions.3 Some states have
long maintained statutes that invalidate marriage entered into by a local
domiciliary in order to evade restrictions of domiciliary law.4 The formu-
lation of such laws is difficult because their scope must be carefully lim-
ited so that prohibitions are not too broadly drawn. A Texas proposal of
19695 was rejected because it was regarded as casting doubt on the valid-
ity of marriages entered into outside Texas by Texas domiciliaries when
the place of marriage was not chosen to defeat Texas law but merely to
satisfy social convention.
Although it may be appropriate for a state to limit the scope of mar-
riage allowed for its present domiciliaries, some further conceptual and
constitutional difficulties are encountered in laying down such rules for
other citizens of the United States who migrate to Texas after having
achieved marital status in a sister state where the rules of marriage do not
conform to Texas's public policy. Although for over a century and a half
Texas has maintained a conflict of laws rule6 designed to impose Texas
matrimonial property law on migrant couples who establish a domicile in
Texas, many have concluded that the formulation of the rule should be
changed to conform to Texas's minimum-contacts-conflict-of-laws rule as
1. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), discussed in Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex
Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return
Home? 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1034 (1994), where much of the literature on the subject is
collected. Id. at 1035 n.10. See also Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be
Recognized in Sister States?, 32 J. OF FAM. L. 551 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha,
Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1995).
2. The Title 1 Review Committee of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas
has considered such a proposal.
3. See Cox, supra note 1 at 1066-68.
4. Id.
5. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to Title I of the Texas Family Code, 5 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 281, 312 (1974).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.01 (Vernon 1993).
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now judicially developed. 7 Thus, drafting an appropriate conflict-of-laws
rule to replace section 4.01 of the Family Code and to enunciate a limited
public policy with respect to marriage presents formidable difficulties.
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
In 1989 the legislature responded to longstanding objection to the doc-
trine of informal marriage and perceived abusive reliance on it by impos-
ing a one-year limitation on asserting the existence of such a union after
the cohabital relationship had terminated. 8 For the family lawyer the in-
stitution of informal marriage is most often encountered in the context of
a marriage to be dissolved by divorce or already dissolved by death, and
for the criminal defense lawyer the institution is most often asserted in
relation to privileged spousal testimony.9 It is in these contexts that the
issue was before the appellate courts during the past year.
In In re Collins'° the respondent had failed to answer or appear to
contest the petitioner's proof of an alleged informal marriage. On appeal
from the divorce decree granted in his absence, he argued that the 1989
statutory amendment created a jurisdictional bar to a court's considera-
tion of an assertion of informal marriage in a divorce filed more than six
years after cohabitation had ceased. Relying on Mossler v. Shields," the
Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the one-year rule
constitutes more than a statute of limitation. 12
The divorce-petitioner's assertion of an informal marriage in Georgia-
des v. Di Ferrante13 was met by the respondent's motion for a declaratory
judgment that no informal marriage existed. The petitioner thereupon
took a non-suit to her cause of action. On appeal by the respondent, the
court held that the respondent's prior assertion of a right to affirmative
relief was not precluded by the petitioner's non-suit. Thus, the trial
court's award of attorney's fees and sanctions against the purported wife
for failure to appear for deposition, as well as an injunction based on the
respondent's cause of action, were not disturbed.' 4
7. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1993).
9. In a criminal case in which an informal marriage was sought to be proved in order
to suppress evidence through assertion of spousal privilege, evidence to prove the informal
marriage was insufficient. Durand v. State, 881 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, no writ). See also State v. Moore, 882 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. App. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 794 (1995) (a Missouri case in which a Texas informal marriage was
alleged but not proved).
10. 870 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
11. 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1991). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw.L.J. 1831, 1834 (1992). See also Russell v. Rus-
sell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 936 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
12. Collins, 870 S.W.2d at 684.
13. 871 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
14. Id. at 881-82. See Hinojosa v. Hinojosa, 866 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1994,
no writ)(succession case in which the issue of informal marriage was not resolved because
the order from which the appeal was taken was not final).
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C. INTERFERENCE WITH A SPOUSE'S PERSONAL RIGHTS
The view is sometimes expressed that in activities with others, a spouse
is subject to the same rules (in relation to the other spouse) as someone
not married to the other spouse. For example, the Texas anti-wiretapping
statute 15 and the federal act 16 on which it is based do not exempt spouses
from their terms. The point is illustrated by a divorce case. In Collins v.
Collins'7 the court held that tapes of telephone conversations made in
violation of those acts should not be admitted into evidence.' 8
The right of privacy afforded spouses by the anti-wiretapping statutes is
in a sense consistent with the objective sought to be achieved by abolition
of a spouse's cause of action against a third person for alienation of the
other spouse's affection or for criminal conversation 19 - activities ordi-
narily secretly pursued.
In Stites v. Gillum20 the husband's alleged paramour, whom the wife
had unsuccessfully sued for "impairment and interference of familial rela-
tionships," sought sanctions against the plaintiff's attorney for bringing
the suit. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions under
Rule 1321 and ordered the attorney to pay $18,000 for the loss she had
incurred. 22 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected the attorney's ap-
peal. The appellate court concluded that the abolition of the action for
alienation of affection left no independent residual action for interference
with familial relations. As the trial court put it, the action filed by the
attorney "was an action for 'alienation of affections' couched in other
terms. " 2 3
In Helena Laboratories Corp. v. Snyder2 4 the Texas Supreme Court al-
luded to the statute abolishing the cause of action for alienation of affec-
tion in a suit against an allegedly negligent employer. The defendant
corporation employed a man and his wife in executive positions and also
employed the wife of the plaintiff as the man's secretary. The man and
his secretary engaged in an extramarital affair. The man's wife and the
secretary's husband brought suit against the corporation for its alleged
negligence in allowing interference with their familial relations. The
court concluded that there is no independent cause of action in Texas for
such negligent conduct. 25
15. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon 1989).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
17. No. 01-91-00782-CV, 1994 WL 416442 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Aug. 11,
1994, no writ).
18. Id. at *3.
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
20. 872 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
22. Stites, 872 S.W.2d at 787.
23. Id. at 790.
24. 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994)(per curiam).
25. Id. at 768-69.
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As against third persons other than paramours, 26 however, the cause of
action for loss of consortium is unaffected and is not preempted by the
federal act,27 except in the view of one dissenting appellate judge.28 In
Wal-Mart Stores v. Alexander29 the Texas Supreme Court reiterated the
elements of the right to recover for loss of consortium as defined in Whit-
tlesey v. Miller30 and later in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Lieck,31 in
which the court stressed the derivative nature of the cause of action in
that the victim-spouse must suffer physical damage so that recovery for
loss of consortium will lie.32
D. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The decision in Helena Laboratories restated the holding in Boyles v.
Kerr33 that there is a cause of action for intentional, but not negligent,
infliction of emotional distress in Texas. In remanding the divorce dis-
pute in Twyman v. Twyman34 for retrial "in the interest of justice" and in
its holding in Massey v. Massey,35 the court recognized that a recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress may be had in a divorce case.
That conclusion is consistent with the sentiment that spouses and non-
spouses should be similarly treated in these regards. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals applied the rule in Behringer v. Behringer.36 The wife
had told her husband that she had contracted with a third person to kill
him, and she had awakened him during the night to warn him of divine
punishment for his acts. On another occasion she pointed a toy pistol at
him and pulled the trigger. She then said, "Since everybody thinks I'm
crazy, I can kill you and they won't do nothing to me." The wife also
hired several private investigators to scrutinize her husband's activities
but none produced evidence of an extramarital affair. The appellate
court held that the wife's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to support
an award of $13,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
26. In Stites, 872 S.W.2d at 790, the court remarked that the action for alienation of
affection rests on the same general grounds as those for compensation of a spouse's loss of
consortium. In this respect, therefore, spouses are not treated the same as non-spouses in
relation to third persons.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988)(as to air-carriers).
28. Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, 882 S.W.2d 496, 505-12 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1994, writ granted) (Hutson-Dunn, J., dissenting).
29. 868 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tex. 1993).
30. 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978).
31. 881 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1994), discussed in Christopher W. Weber, Note, .The Loss of
Consortium-Malicious Prosecution Nexus, 26 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 217 (1995).
32. 881 S.W.2d at 294-95. See also Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 885 S.W.2d 538, 549-50
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
33. 858 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 1161, 1162-63 (1994).
34. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). See Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Inten-
tionally or Recklessly Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1253 (1994).
35. 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993).
36. 884 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
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If a spouse's sexual activities with another are sufficiently ostentatious
to amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress on his or her
spouse, a cause of action may lie in favor of the aggrieved spouse. Prior
to Twyman the point was broached by the facts in Chiles v. Chiles37 but
the action failed.
E. INTRAFAMILIAL INSURANCE
Concepts of both tort and contract law impinge on the law of status in
relation to a contract of insurance to discharge a family member's liability
for injury to another family member. As long as the principle of immu-
nity from suit protected those who caused harm in such instances, the
family-member-exclusion clause in automobile insurance policies was
consistent with the prevailing law of tort. But with the disappearance of
tortious immunity the imposition of such restrictions by insurers with the
approval of the State Board of Insurance had become an anachronism.
In National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson38 the Supreme
Court of Texas terminated what amounted to a limitation of the contrac-
tual powers of a family member to protect himself or herself from liability
for actionable harm inflicted on another family member. In Johnson the
court held that a husband's insurer was required to defend him in a suit
brought by his wife for negligent injury39 and that there is no rational
justification for the policy endorsement approved by the State Board of
Insurance to preclude liability on an insurance policy 40 in light of the re-
quirement of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act4' that all Texas
automobile owners carry a minimum amount of liability insurance to
cover potential liability. As in some other states with mandatory insur-
ance laws where family-member-exclusion clauses are invalid, the court
held that such clauses are void because such clauses violate public
policy.42
F. MARITAL FRAUD
The fraud complained of in Oliver v. Oliver43 did not directly involve
property, but the damages suffered as a result of the fraud were contrib-
uted to by the amount of property accumulated but not divisible on di-
vorce as a result of the perpetration of the fraud. The deception asserted
by the ex-wife was that for several years prior to her suit for divorce her
37. 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied). See Joseph
W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw.L.J. 1,
3 (1990); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw.L.J. 415, 416 (1991).
38. 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993), discussed in Deborah C. Maschal, Note, The Demise of
the Family Member Exclusion Clause in Automobile Insurance Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1103 (1994).
39. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d at 2-3.
40. Id.
41. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6791h, §§ 1(10), 1A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
42. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d at 4-5.
43. 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994).
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ex-husband had led her to believe that they were married, while they had
actually been divorced by a New Mexico court without her knowledge.
In 1979 the husband had brought suit for divorce in New Mexico, where
the couple was then domiciled, and procured his wife's signature to a
waiver of consent to citation. The wife was so distressed by giving her
consent, however, that her husband assured her that they would continue
to be husband and wife. The husband, nevertheless, proceeded with the
divorce without his wife's knowledge. Thereafter the couple continued to
live together as husband and wife, and New Mexico law does not recog-
nize informal marriage. In 1987 the couple moved to Texas and estab-
lished an informal marriage there. In the husband's Texas suit for divorce
in 1988, the wife counterclaimed for fraud in the concealment of the prior
divorce. In the wife's suit, she was awarded damages, but the court held
that her claim was defeated by the statute of limitation. In reviewing the
judgment of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,44 the
Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the counterclaim was filed
timely.45
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. PREMARITAL PARTITION
An argument based on the misreading of the second and third clauses
in the 1980 amendment to Article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitu-
tion might have been avoided by more thoughtful draftsmanship. The
second clause of the article provides that "persons about to marry and
spouses ... may ... partition between themselves all or part of their
property, then existing or to be acquired. ' 46 "All" includes every kind of
property that is or would be community property in the future, though it
is usually only future income from future spouses' separate property
which parties wish to partition. This clause in the constitution responded
to the conclusion of the Texas Supreme Court that an
agreement was void to the extent that the income or other property
should be separate property of the party who earned [it] or whose
property produced such income or acquisition. Such provisions were
no more than a mere agreement between the parties to establish the
character of the property prior to its acquisition during marriage in
violation of the Texas Constitution and the Family Code .... 47
Modeled on the proviso of the 1948 constitutional amendment that it re-
placed, this clause deals with bilateral transactions between spouses, that
is, partitions and exchanges. The fourth clause of the 1980 amendment
deals with interspousal gifts and was prompted by a series of tax cases in
which the Internal Revenue Service had asserted that a gift of one spouse
44. Oliver v. Oliver, 853 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992), aff'd, 889 S.W.2d 271
(Tex. 1994).
45. Oliver, 889 S.W.2d at 273.
46. TEx. CONST. art XVI, § 15.
47. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978).
1995]
SMU LAW REVIEW
to the other did not constitute a gift of the whole amount transferred
because the donor continued to receive half the income from the entire
gift as community property.48 The intervening clause added in 1980 al-
lows spouses to agree that the past and future income from only one
spouse's separate property can be changed to the separate property of the
owner. The draftsmen of the amendment were particularly concerned
that spouses might so agree as to the income produced by property which
had been already given by one spouse to the other.4 9
The 1980 clause dealing with interspousal "agreements" concerning in-
come from "the separate property of one of them" made no reference to
partitions or exchanges and was not meant to deal with such transac-
tion.50 This clause referred merely to spousal agreements concerning the
income from separate property of "one of them."5' The unilateral aspect
of the provision was clarified in the 1987 amendment which amplified the
phrase to refer to "only one of them."' 52 The addition of the word "only"
seemed necessary so that readers would not misinterpret the clause to
apply bilaterally. The clause had been misunderstood by the draftsmen
of the Fanning agreement,53 and it is evident that it has been misunder-
stood by others. In Dokmanovic v. Schwarz54 a misunderstanding of the
clause prompted an argument that this third clause limits the application
of the prior clause. It was asserted that because the third clause expressly
allows spouses to agree concerning income from separate property, it
thereby impliedly excluded persons about to marry from partitioning fu-
ture acquisitions of income from separate property. But the transaction
referred to in the latter clause (an agreement with unilateral effect be-
tween spouses) and in the former clause (a partition with bilateral effect)
are not sufficiently alike to produce that logical implication. The Hous-
48. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 34 Sw.L.J. 115, 129-31 (1980).
49. Neither the draftsmen nor anyone else closely involved in the passage of the
amendment intended or anticipated that the provisions of the amendment might be con-
strued as retrospective in effect. If that result had been anticipated, it would have been
unnecessary to insert this clause as drafted.
50. See Joseph W. McKnight & Robert E. Davis, For Constitutional Amendment No. 9,
43 TEX. B.J. 921, 924 (1980). This summary of the purposes for the amendment is a short-
ened version of the commentary of the draftsmen presented to the Committee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Texas House of Representatives in support of the amendment
during the 1980 legislative session. See also Joseph W. McKnight, The Constitutional Re-
definition of Texas Matrimonial Property as it Affects Antenuptial and Interspousal Transac-
tions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449, 464-65 (1982).
51. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
52. Id.
53. Fanning v. Fanning, 828 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992), rev'd per curiam,
847 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. 1993) (commented on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1480-81 (1993)); cf Pearce v.
Pearce, 824 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1991, writ denied) (where the clause was
relied on by the parties for the purpose for which it was intended: a mere spousal agree-
ment rather than a partition). The Texas constitutional provision is again misunderstood in
Robert D. Williams, Comment, To What Extent Does the Texas Constitution Allow
Couples, in a Premarital Agreement, to Characterize Property to be Acquired During Mar-
riage as Separate Property, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 1046, 1052 (1992-93).
54. 880 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
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ton Fourteenth District Court of Appeals rejected this argument in sus-
taining the validity of the premarital partition of future acquisitions of
income from the future spouses' separate properties.55
B. INTERSPOUSAL GIFr
If a spouse buys property during marriage using his or her separate
property to pay for it and puts title in the name of the other spouse, a
presumption of gift arises in favor of the grantee-spouse.5 6 In In re Thur-
mond57 the spouses bought realty in the names of both spouses, which
was paid for with the husband's separate cash and community credit.
Thus, in the absence of rebuttal, one-half of the proportionate part of the
whole property paid for with the husband's separate property is pre-
sumed to be a gift by the husband to the wife.58 To rebut the presump-
tion, the court said in Thurmond, the claimant of the separate interest
need merely show the payment of his or her separate funds and need not
show a lack of donative intent.59 Such a conclusion, however, confuses
proof of expenditure of separate funds (which is a prerequisite to applica-
tion of the presumption) with the operation of the presumption of gift
itself. Nor does this statement of the quantum of proof necessary to re-
but the presumption conform to authorities on which the court relied.60
In Thurmond6' the court said that the cases relied on by the wife were
decided before the 1987 amendment to section 5.01,62 which changed the
burden of rebutting the community property presumption in favor of a
separate acquisition during marriage from a preponderance of the evi-
dence to clear and convincing evidence. But surely the change makes the
burden of rebuttal more onerous rather than less so.
In McClure v. McClure63 the character of two bank accounts was in
issue in a suit for divorce. At marriage the husband had separate prop-
erty on deposit. Using separate funds, the husband opened an account in
his and his wife's name as their "operating account." The husband also
added the name of his wife to a money market account held at marriage
so that she might draw on the account in case of his death. After ten
55. Dokmanovic, 880 S.W.2d at 273-76. In Edgington v. Maddison, 870 S.W.2d 187,
188 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.), the trial court invalidated the provi-
sion of a premarital agreement that the income from the separate property of the spouses
would be the separate property of the owner of the property; however, that conclusion was
not appealed.
56. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975); Smith v. Strahan, 16
Tex. 314, 323-24 (1856).
57. In re Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d 269, 273-75 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
58. Id. at 273.
59. Id. at 274-75.
60. Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ);
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 791 S.W.2d 659,664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ). Both
cases were decided after the 1987 amendment to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon
1993).
61. Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d at 278.
62. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1993).
63. 870 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
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weeks the couple separated, and the wife consulted a lawyer about a di-
vorce. On filing for divorce the wife withdrew $7500 from the first ac-
count and $17,000 from the second account. The wife argued that she was
entitled to keep as much of those funds as remained unspent because her
husband told her to leave and "that he would pay her rent, her salary, and
her expenses." 64 The divorce court concluded that those funds were the
husband's separate property and that the husband was entitled to as
much of those funds that were still on hand at divorce. In sustaining this
conclusion the appellate court said that the court below could have rea-
sonably concluded that the husband intended that the accounts be avail-
able for community purposes but that a gift of the entire amount was not
intended. The court held in effect that the wife was not required to ac-
count for the money already spent for community purposes but was re-
quired to return the remainder. 65
During the marriage the husband had also transferred $42,000 to his
wife to discharge a mortgage on her separate condominium. She used
$20,000 for that purpose and deposited the remaining $22,000 in her sav-
ing account. On divorce the husband claimed the $22,000 on deposit, but
the wife asserted that she should be allowed to use it for the purpose for
which it was provided. 66 In sustaining her position, the court relied on an
Arkansas case 67 in which the court stated
while a voluntary donor may revoke his gift at any time before the
compliance by the other party with the condition upon which it is to
be delivered, yet, when the donee has partially complied with such
condition to the acceptance of the donor['s gift], the donor cannot
then withdraw his donation without giving the donee an opportunity
to fully comply.68
The court held that the $22,000 was therefore the wife's separate property
provided that she use the funds for discharging the indebtedness on her
condominium.69
C. GIFT OF A THIRD PERSON TO A SPOUSE
The argument was made in Roosth v. Roosth7 ° that because evidence as
to whom wedding and engagement presents were given was so conflict-
ing, the community presumption should prevail. The appellate court re-
sponded that it was nonetheless clear that the acquisitions were gifts and
64. Id. at 361.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 360.
67. Brown v. Albright, 110 Ark. 394, 401,161 S.W. 1036, 1039 (1913), cited in McClure,
870 S.W.2d at 361.
68. McClure, 870 S.W.2d at 361.
69. Id. The trial court had also awarded the husband his attorney's fees. In light of
the fact that part of the trial court's judgment was reversed, the issue of attorney's fees was
remanded to the trial court.
70. 889 S.W.2d 445, 457 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist. 1994, writ denied).
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that a gift by a third person to the spouses constitutes a gift of an undi-
vided interest as separate property to each.71
In Burgess v. Easley72 an ex-wife sought partition of land alleged to be
community property but undivided on divorce. The land was conveyed to
the husband by his parents and was recorded by the grantors during the
marriage. It was therefore presumed that the grantors delivered the deed
at the date of execution and acknowledgment,73 and the recordation thus
constituted a constructive delivery.74 The grantee-husband, however, tes-
tified that he was unaware of the conveyance, and the court held that
title, therefore, had not passed to him until the deed's actual delivery,
which occurred after the grantee's divorce.75 The community presump-
tion was therefore rebutted.76
D. CREDIT PURCHASES AND LOANS
It is a corollary of the community presumption that property acquired
on credit or with money borrowed during marriage is presumed to be
community property unless a spouse can prove that the seller of the prop-
erty bought on credit or the lender of the money used to make the
purchase looked solely to the separate credit of the buying or borrowing
spouse. 77 If the claimant shows that separate collateral was given for a
loan, the claimant does not thereby discharge the burden of showing that
separate property was borrowed unless the lender agreed that he has no
recourse to other assets if the collateral is insufficient to repay the loan in
full.78 These propositions are illustrated by Jones v. Jones.79 In a divorce
the husband asserted that particular treasury notes were his separate
property. The notes had been purchased during marriage with money
borrowed by the husband from a bank. The husband had pledged a sepa-
rate certificate of deposit as collateral for the loan. The proceeds of the
loan did not thereby become the husband's separate property, however,
because there was no evidence that the bank "would limit itself to satisfy-
ing the debt by only the [separate] collateral or only the separate prop-
erty of [the husband]."80 The borrower's intention to hold the property
71. Id. (citing McLemore v. McLemore, 641 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982,
no writ)).
72. 893 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
73. Hicks v. Loveless, 714 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Lichtenstein v. F & M Nat'l Bank, 372 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no
writ).
74. Levy v. Winfree, 99 S.W.2d 1043, 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1936, no writ).
75. Burgess, 893 S.W.2d at 91.
76. The evidence in the record was evidently insufficient to disprove the recital of
consideration in the deed and thus to show that the conveyance was a gift.
77. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1937). See Ray v. United
States, 385 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd 538 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1976). See also In re
Thurmond, 888 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
78. Heidenheimer Bros. v. McKeen, 63 Tex. 229 (1885).
79. 890 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ requested).
80. Id. at 476.
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to repay the loan out of separate funds "has never been controlling."'8 '
The court thus avoided an erroneous implication of its errant opinion in
Welder v. Welder82 that the mere agreement of both spouses that a loan
should be for the benefit of only one of them controls the character of the
funds borrowed. Texas law requires a written spousal partition or ex-
change of property to achieve that result.83
E. INCOME FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY
It is a fundamental axiom of Texas matrimonial property law that in-
come from separate property is community property. That principle was
made abundantly clear by the Texas Supreme Court in 1859 in De Blane
v. Hugh Lynch & Co.8 despite the contrary implication of statutory law
at the time.85 In Yaklin v. Glusing, Sharpe & Krueger86 an ex-husband
brought suit against his alleged former counsel, urging inter alia that but
for the attorney's errors in preparing certain refinancing documents, the
income from certain separate property would have been the plaintiff's
separate property. Contrary to his assertion, however, the income from
his separate property would have been community property, and an
agreement between the ex-husband and a third person could not have
changed the character of the property.
F. BUSINESS ENTITIES
In Cole v. Cole87 the wife asserted in her suit for divorce that her hus-
band owned a partnership interest in a business. The husband testified
that his mother owned the business and that he was his mother's em-
ployee or agent. Although a partner is an agent for his partner, relation-
ships arising from an agency and those of a partnership are different. The
mere fact of agency does not, without more, show a partnership.
88
G. PARENTAL RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY OF A CHILD
In the Matrimonial Property Act of 196789 separate property was de-
fined to include spousal recovery for personal injury except for the loss of
earning power. In 1972 the Texas Supreme Court decided Graham v.
Franco,9° concerning facts that had occurred prior to the January 1, 1968,
effective date of the statute, and prior to the adoption of the principle of
81. Id. at 475.
82. 794 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
83. TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 15.
84. 23 Tex. 25 (1859).
85. See Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law: Conservative Attitudes,
Reluctant Change, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 78 (1993).
86. 875 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
87. 880 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
88. In Cole there was no evidence of the husband's ownership of the business.
89. 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 309, § 16, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 736 (codified at TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1993)).
90. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
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comparative negligence in 1973.91 The court held that the definition of
recovery for a spouse's personal injury as provided by the statute of 1967
was constitutional. 92 In the following two decades the court has added
further refinements to the rules of spousal recovery.93 Development of
rules for characterization of spousal recovery for injury to a child has
proceeded slowly.94 Those principles were alluded to in Enochs v.
Brown,95 though the facts of that case dealt with the rights of divorced
parents to recover for injury to their child. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's award of unequal amounts to each parent for loss of com-
panionship with the child.96 "Two factors to be considered in awarding
loss of companionship are the living arrangements of the parties and the
relationship between the parents and the child." 97 Would a disparity for
loss be appropriate for awards of separate property to married parents
with whom the child is living in an ordinary familial relationship?
H. RETIREMENT BENEFITS CONTROLLED BY THE SOVEREIGN
Disputes dealing with property acquired from the national sovereign in
relation to the determination of a matrimonial property interest under
Texas law are subject to the strictures of the federal supremacy clause. 98
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo,99 a large body of law has developed with respect to retirement
benefits subject to federal law. Rules concerning benefits stemming from
employment by the national sovereign itself constitute a significant
amount of that law, particularly in relation to military retirement bene-
fits. As a consequence of the Court's later decision in McCarty v. Mc-
Carty'00 on June 26, 1981, Congress provided that in 1982101 state law
would apply to the division of benefits on divorce payable after June 25,
1981, and in 1990, state law would not apply to divorces rendered before
June 25, 1981.102 In Walton v. Lee'03 an ex-wife sought partition of her
ex-husband's military retirement benefits not divided in a 1976 Texas di-
vorce decree. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the ex-
91. Act of Feb. 22, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 28, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 40 (codified at
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986)). For a general review of
these developments see Patricia J. Shackelford, Comment, The Community Property De-
fense Revisited: Twenty Years after Graham v. Franco, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 71 (1993).
92. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15.
93. See McKnight, supra note 85, at 83-85.
94. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 42 Sw.L.J. 1, 20-21 (1988).
95. 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
96. Id. at 321-22.
97. Id
98. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
99. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
100. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
101. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Public Law 103-336, codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)(1988).
102. Id. By their specific terms, the two acts omit benefits arising on and covering one
day, June 25, 1981, the day before McCarty was decided.
103. 888 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied).
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husband and the ex-wife appealed. The court held that the 1982 congres-
sional act applied to allow partition of the benefits. 1°4 In his dissent Chief
Justice Walker pointed out that the 1990 enactment was controlling.10 5
The chief justice is, of course, correct.
In Hernandez v. Igloo Products Corp. Retirement Plan106 the husband
and wife separated in 1957 but never divorced. Thereafter the husband
lived with the plaintiff and in 1979 named her as beneficiary of his em-
ployment benefits. The husband died in 1989 prior to retirement. In 1992
the widow began receiving benefits under the plan, though she had exe-
cuted an assignment of her rights to the named beneficiary in 1990. In
1994 the plaintiff sued the trustee of the plan and the widow for the
benefits.
The plan provided an annuity for a spouse who survived an employee
who had not retired and further provided that the survivor might elect to
waive the annuity benefit with the employee's consent in writing. Under
the provisions of the federal statute 107 that election is required to be
made during the lifetime of the employee. Although the surviving wife
had purported to assign her right to the designated beneficiary, the plan
itself prohibited assignment. Thus, under the plan created by applicable
federal law the designated beneficiary was barred from taking.
I. TERM LIFE INSURANCE
In Estate of Cavenaugh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue108 the Tax
Court considered the character of proceeds from a term life insurance
policy in an estate tax context. The husband had acquired the policy on
his life during his first marriage. The policy had no cash or loan value but
provided for an annual dividend to be credited to the policy. In her will
the first wife provided for specific dispositions of real property and a trust
of the residue of her property for her husband for life and then for their
children. An estate tax return was filed for the deceased wife's estate, but
no tax was paid. The surviving husband, as executor, made no distribu-
tion of the decedent's share of community property. Thereafter, the sur-
viving husband remarried and died several years later. In the settlement
of his estate between the children of the first marriage and his second
wife, it was agreed that the husband died intestate and an estate tax re-
turn was filed by the administrator of his estate. In that return the admin-
istrator included an interest in only one-half of the life insurance policy as
the decedent's community property share and asserted that the other
one-half of the property had belonged to the estate of his deceased wife
and thus passed as part of her residuary estate. 109 The Commissioner
104. Id. at 606.
105. Id. at 609.
106. 868 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
107. 26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(6)(B)(1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (c)(6)(1990).
108. 100 T.C. 407 (1993).
109. Id. at 422.
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contended that the entire value of the life insurance policy was includable
in the husband's gross estate because the inception of title doctrine,
which would characterize the policy as community property, did not ap-
ply to term life insurance policies, as it would apply to whole life
policies. 110
Because a term life insurance policy provides pure life insurance, has
no cash surrender value or loan value, and only furnishes insurance
protection for a specified limited period of time (until the next re-
newal date), . . . any community interest of [the first wife] in the
unmatured policy lapsed on the policy's first renewal date following
her death."'
Putting that argument somewhat differently, the tax court concluded that
even if the inception of title rule properly characterized the interest in the
policy, the entire value of the policy was includable in the husband's es-
tate because the first wife's interest in the policy ended during the hus-
band's lifetime even though the wife's estate was not partitioned. "[The
wife's] community interest in the policy equalled no more than one-half
of any cash surrender value or interpolated terminal reserve value of the
policy at her death."112 Thus, the policy had no value at her death, and
no distribution of an interest was necessary to settle her estate. 113
Although a cogent argument can be made that when any term life insur-
ance policy is renewed, a new policy is put into effect, 114 it can also be
argued with much reason that there are elements in many term policies
that relate each renewal to the initial contract. For example, term policies
frequently provide for maintenance of the initial premium regardless of
the age of the insured and may also have no requirement of a physical
examination of the insured on renewal. In the latter case the waiver of
physical examination makes the term policy particularly valuable to the
insured when ill health may have made him uninsurable at any affordable
premium rate. Such elements of term policies give them real value that
relates each renewal of the policy to the initial contract and thus to the
inception of title doctrine. In Cavenaugh the policy provided a right of
renewal at a fixed (though increasing) rate for twenty-one years, without
proof of insurability, a right to convert to whole life policy, a right to
claim proceeds despite suicide of the insured after two years, and an in-
vestment feature by way of the annual dividend that is ordinarily absent
from term policies." 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on these
110. Id. at 422-23.
111. Id. at 423.
112. Id. at 424.
113. Id. The court relied on Mitchell v. Mitchell, 448 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which a post-divorce claim for an undivided
interest in a federal group life insurance policy was denied to an ex-wife after the ex-
husband's death without mention of the Texas inception of title doctrine.
114. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 544 P.2d 294 (Idaho 1975); Phillips v. Wellborn,
552 P.2d 471 (N.M. 1976); Gaethje v. Gaethje, 442 P.2d 870 (Ariz. App. 1968).
115. Cavenaugh, 100 T.C. at 424. There is the further point that one of the policies of
life insurance in McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963,
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aspects of the term policy to conclude that the inception of title doctrine
operated to characterize the insurance proceeds as community property
under Texas law.116
III. CONTROL AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. REIMBURSEMENT FOR FRAUD AND RELATED CLAIMS
An interspousal claim for reimbursement can be based on a number of
grounds involving actual fraud, constructive fraud, and unjust enrich-
ment; however, a claim for wrongful mismanagement by which the other
spouse is deprived of a community interest may not be maintained as well
as a reimbursement claim based on the same facts. 117
In Connell v. Connell18 a wife sued her husband for divorce and al-
leged a number of unproved charges of fraud and constructive fraud
against the husband and his paramour. The trial court granted a directed
verdict in favor of the husband and his alleged accomplice. Because no
actual or constructive fraud was proved, however, when the court ad-
verted to matters of law, it was usually in the way of obiter dicta, and the
concept of reimbursement was not consistently defined." 9 Although the
court correctly stated the general rule that the torts of conversion and
conspiracy are barred by the running of the two-year statute of limita-
tion,120 for the purpose of showing marital reimbursement proof of
spousal acts akin to those torts are not barred until two years after a
marriage has ended. 121
In Street v. Skipper122 the deceased husband acquired policies of life
insurance on his life during marriage and paid the premiums with com-
munity funds. The proceeds of the policies (approximately $1,250,000)
were made payable to the husband's estate of which his widow took an
amount well in excess of one-half the value of the insurance proceeds
under the husband's will, as well as over $200,000 of her husband's sepa-
rate property and her right of occupancy of the homestead, which was
also the husband's separate property. Considering that the widow re-
ceived well over one-half of the entire community estate of almost
$4,600,000 (including the insurance proceeds), the appellate court con-
firmed the trial court's refusal to award the widow any claim for construc-
tive fraud either in disposition of the insurance proceeds or for payment
writ ref'd), in which the application of the inception of title doctrine to life insurance poli-
cies was established, was a term policy prior to conversion.
116. Estate of Cavenaugh v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1995 WL 238779, at *7-8
(5th Cir. May 10, 1995).
117. In re Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 827-30 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
118. 889 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
119. The court suggests that a reimbursement claim arises exclusively in cases of im-
provement of one marital estate by another, id. at 540, but also states that the wasting of
community assets may also produce a right of reimbursement. Id. at 534-44.
120. Id. at 540-41, citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
121. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
122. 887 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, n.w.h.).
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of the premiums on the policies.123 The widow also attacked submission
of the issue of the "fairness" of the testator's disposition of the insurance
proceeds to the jury, which had returned an affirmative verdict. The
ground for the widow's objection was that the issue was not controlling
and the answer did not control the verdict. The appellate court found
that the issue was controlling, and that because the verdict was supported
by the evidence, it supported the judgment. 124 One cannot contest those
conclusions; however, submission of the issue of reasonableness of the
donor-spouse's disposition is appropriately a matter for the judge to de-
termine, and if submitted to the jury, the jury's verdict should be taken as
merely advisory.
The reimbursement issue in Rider v. Rider125 was simple but neverthe-
less provoked a dissent. The divorce court awarded the husband reim-
bursement for use of his separate funds to discharge a lien on the wife's
separate land in Mississippi and for his separate property which his wife
had wrongfully taken and spent, and the court put a lien on the land for
repayment for both amounts.1 26 The dissenting judge, curiously, read
Heggen v. Pemelton127 as allowing a reimbursement lien only for commu-
nity improvements to separate land.' 28
The facts of Edgington v. Maddison129 are reminiscent of those of
Spruill v. Spruill130 and Jones v. Jones.131 If the parties had been familiar
with those earlier cases, the issues in Edgington might have been better
framed. In 1988 the wife sued her husband for divorce and joined Truck
Co., his wholly owned separate corporation, as a party. The court or-
dered the husband to maintain the corporation and not to transfer any of
its assets. Some time before the filing of the divorce the husband had
given a friend and a business associate a note for $150,000, and two
months before the divorce was filed the friend sued the husband on the
note. Three months after the divorce was filed the friend took a default
judgment against the husband for $225,000.132 The friend then incorpo-
rated Dual Co., and Truck Co. was dissolved. In purported settlement of
the judgment, the husband transferred all the former assets of Truck Co.
to Dual Co. and became an employee of his friend under very liberal
terms. Several months thereafter the wife added her husband's friend
and Dual Co. as parties to the suit for divorce, alleging that they had
acted with the husband to defraud her of the community income from
123. Id. at 81.
124. Id. at 82.
125. 887 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, n.w.h.).
126. The wife had also gratuitously transferred the land to her father in defiance of the
divorce court order. Id. at 258-59. The trial court's erroneous imposition of the lien on
foreign realty was not questioned on appeal.
127. 836 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1992).
128. Rider, 887 S.W.2d at 264.
129. 870 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
130. 624 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, writ dism'd).
131. 804 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
132. Edgington, 870 S.W.2d at 188.
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Truck Co.133 At the trial of the suit the jury found that the value of assets
transferred from the husband to his friend so greatly exceeded the
amount of the default judgment as to constitute a fraud against his wife's
rights in the community estate and awarded her a judgment of $75,000
against the friend. 134 The appellate court made it plain that the hus-
band's transfer of the assets of Truck Co. to his friend constituted a viola-
tion of the temporary orders of the divorce court, 135 but did not define
the nature of the wife's asserted community rights other than to say that
"[h]er cause of action was directed at the fraud perpetrated on her in the
transfer of her community interest in the assets.' 36 Because there was
no mention of any assertion that Truck Co. was the alter ego of the hus-
band, the court must have meant that the retained earnings of Truck Co.
constituted assets for which the community was owed reimbursement.
The court also held that the wife had not collaterally attacked the friend's
prior judgment though such an attack under the circumstances would
have been permissible. 137 This case therefore had the potential of being a
fraudulent transfer case. The case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
In situations involving a spouse's separate corporate interest, the other
spouse commonly seeks reimbursement from the corporate owner for the
enhancement of value of the separate interest. In Southwest Livestock &
Trucking Co. v. Dooley138 a corporation in which the husband owned a
twenty-five percent interest as separate property was joined by the wife
as a party-respondent in a divorce case. The wife asserted that the hus-
band's fractional separate interest in the corporation amounted to his al-
ter ego.139 Without noting that the husband did not own a controlling
interest in the corporation, the appellate court held that the wife could
not "avail herself of the equitable doctrine of alter ego when she partici-
pated in the very act which gave rise to her cause of action, disregarding
the corporate structure.' 140 The unusual aspect of the case was that the
corporation counterclaimed against both spouses for misappropriation of
corporate funds. On appeal, the corporation was awarded an accounting
to be achieved prior to any division of the community,14' a right to trace-
able assets, and a further right to imposition of a constructive trust on
commingled funds.142
133. Id. at 188-89.
134. Id. at 189.
135. Id. at 190.
136. Id. In the related context of drafting a buy-sell agreement for one of the spouses in
which joinder of the other spouse is sought in order to meet a future objection that the
joining spouse might raise, see Wendy L. Hunkele-Martinez, From a Spouse's Perspective,
55 TEX. BAR. J. 9323 (1992).
137. Edgington, 870 S.W.2d at 190.
138. 884 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
139. Id. at 810.
140. Id.
141. Id.




Nelson v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co.143 illustrates continuing
problems in applying the general rules of spousal liability. Joined by his
wife, the husband executed two notes and deeds of trust' 44 of real prop-
erty to secure a note of a separate corporation of which the husband was
president. The husband alone executed a guarantee of another note for
the same purpose. The corporation and both spouses defaulted on all the
notes, and the deeds of trust were foreclosed. The deeds provided that
the security should be applied to "any and all indebtedness created by the
undersigned in favor of [the bank]."'1 45 After paying the notes for which
both spouses were obligated, there was money remaining which the
lender-bank sought to apply to the payment of the husband's guarantee
in which the wife did not join. The wife sought return of one-half of the
amount remaining, leaving the other half to discharge only as part of the
husband's sole (but not separate) obligation on the further note. The
court held that because the wife was not liable on the further guarantee,
one-half of the remaining proceeds were returnable as she claimed. Her
interpretation of the form of the joint notes was very generous. A con-
vincing argument could have been made that the deeds secured only joint
obligations and that none of the security was applicable to pay the hus-
band's personal guarantee under the terms of the joint notes. The bank,
however, should have been able to reach all of the remaining collateral as
jointly managed community property, subject to satisfaction of the hus-
band's sole obligation if not under the terms of the deeds of trust.146
In In re Duval County Ranch147 the wife sought recovery of certain
community property, rescission of a conveyance of community property,
and removal of a cloud from her title to community property. Her pro-
ceeding was filed in state court against her husband's trustee in bank-
ruptcy and was removed to the bankruptcy court. The property at issue
was community property subject to the husband's sole management. 148
The object of the wife's claim was to recover damages against the trustee
for mental anguish for breach of fiduciary duty in a commercial transac-
tion, a claim asserted as a separate property cause of action. Because all
the damage claims involved property of the bankruptcy estate and acts of
parties regarding that property, the bankruptcy court held that it had ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the cause and denied the motion to proceed in state
court.
14 9
143. 881 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
144. It seems to have been assumed that the subject matter of the deeds of trust was
subject to the joint management of the spouses.
145. Nelson, 881 S.W.2d at 129.
146. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1993).
147. 167 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994).
148. Id. at 849.
149. Id. at 850.
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In re Knobel150 involved a husband's and wife's joint petition for relief
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 51 The question before the
court was whether a joint bankruptcy filing creates one taxable entity or
two for purposes of entitlement to personal exemptions and deductions
for federal income tax purposes. The court first concluded that a couple's
filing of a joint petition in bankruptcy does not ipso facto constitute a
consolidation of both spouses' estates under section 302(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 152 In this case of apparent first impression 153 the court went
on to hold that unless the consolidation of the estates is ordered, each
estate is entitled to a personal exemption and a standard deduction for
federal income tax purposes.a54
Trust assets may in some instances be the object of satisfaction for
creditors of both settlors and beneficiaries. In Soto v. First Gibraltar
Bank' 55 a husband and wife had opened a revocable trust account with
the defendant bank. The husband and wife were designated as trustees
and their daughter, as beneficiary. Almost all of the funds were savings
of the wife from her earnings, and the purpose of the fund was to defray
the cost of the daughter's education. At the time the trust account was
opened, the husband and wife were having marital difficulties and each
wanted to insulate the account from unilateral withdrawals by the other.
Both settlors nevertheless maintained the power to make joint withdraw-
als from the account. When the husband's checking account at the bank
was overdrawn, the bank offset the overdraft with funds from the trust
account. When the wife learned of the setoff, she sued the bank for con-
version, breach of bailment, and violation of the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.' 56 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding in
favor of the bank. In this instance, the court concluded that, the husband
and wife continued to own the trust account and had access to the
funds. 57 The gift to their daughter was therefore revocable. The court
also reasoned that the funds in the account were jointly managed by vir-
tue of the agreement of deposit and were therefore subject to the bank's
claim against either spouse. 158
The Texas rule for spendthrift trusts is that a settlor of a trust who is
also the beneficiary of the trust cannot thereby protect the assets of the
150. 167 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
151. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
152. kd § 302(b). In the course of its reasoning the court discussed some of the
problems of conflicting claims of each spouse's creditors that would repel a motion for
consolidation. Knobel, 167 B.R. at 438'
153. Knobel, 167 B.R. at 437.
154. Id. at 430. In this case no federal income tax return had been filed by the couple
for 1992 because they had concluded that no tax was due for a married couple filing sepa-
rately. For a discussion of choices for a debtor and non-debtor spouses with respect to
income tax liability, see Ann F. Thomas, Joint Tax Return Liability and Bankruptcy, 14
FAIRSHARE 11 (1994).
155. 868 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd).
156. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01-17.854 (Vernon 1987).
157. Soto, 868 S.W.2d. at 402.
158. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.61(c) (Vernon 1993).
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trust from satisfaction of the settlor-beneficiary's debts.' 59 The family
trust at issue in In re Shurley'60 was created in 1965. The parents contrib-
uted two-thirds of the corpus of the trust and each daughter contributed
one-sixth. During the joint lives of all the settlors and until the father's
death in 1967, all the beneficiaries enjoyed income from the trust in the
same fractions as their contributions to the corpus. On the death of the
father each of the three remaining beneficiaries enjoyed one third of the
income. After the death of the mother in 1971 the two daughters shared
the income equally. The trustee, however, could limit distribution of in-
come almost at his complete discretion and had complete control over the
distribution of the corpus to the beneficiaries. The younger daughter and
her husband filed for bankruptcy in 1993, and the trustee in bankruptcy
claimed one-half of the trust as part of the estate in bankruptcy. The
principal question before the court was what fraction of the trust would
pass to the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court held that because
she was a settlor, the bankrupt daughter was the settlor of one-half the
trust (not merely one-sixth) to which the spendthrift provisions ap-
plied.' 61 Thus, one-half of the corpus of the trust passed to her trustee in
bankruptcy. The court further stated that the fact that the bankrupt's
contribution to the corpus was still in esse in the corpus and readily iden-
tifiable was irrelevant. 162 The principle of tracing, elsewhere widely ap-
plied in Texas family property law, was thus brushed aside.
C. HOMESTEAD: DESIGNATION AND EXTENT
Maintenance of a home by continued occupancy of land sold to an-
other or on land held as a tenancy at-will from another has been the sub-
ject matter of numerous disputes.163 In Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Olivarez,164 parents conveyed their homestead to their son but continued
to make their home on the premises. The son then gave a deed of trust
on the property to secure a loan. After the son's default the trustee
under the deed sought to foreclose and the parents attempted to inter-
pose their homestead interest to preclude the foreclosure. The Fifth Cir-
159. Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. 171 B.R. 769 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
161. Id. at 783-86.
162. Id. at 786. The bankrupt's interest in that portion of the trust corpus which was
contributed to the intervivos trust from the wills of the parents was also not excluded from
the bankruptcy estate as an inheritance of the bankrupt under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(1988). Id.
163. See, e.g., Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575 (1941); Rettig v. Houston
West End Realty Co., 254 S.W. 765, 767-68 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted); In
re Girard, 104 BR. 817 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); McSpedden v. Moore, 728 S.W.2d 439(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Commerce Bank v. McCreary, 677
S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ); Shepler v. Kubena, 563 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ); Nash v. Conatser, 410 S.W.2d 512, 521-22 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966, no writ); Williams v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust Co. 104 S.W.2d 56,
57 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ ref'd); Hampton v. Gilliland, 56 S.W. 572,
573-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1900, no writ).
164. 29 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1994).
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cuit Court of Appeals rejected their effort: the parents' right of
occupancy proceeded from the title holder, and with the passing of title
from the son to the new owner that right ceased. 165 Because the claimant
had failed to show a property interest required for asserting a homestead
claim, the court said that an assertion of estoppel against the creditor was
beside the point. 166
In In re Reed167 the court considered the rights of the seller of a home-
stead under the Texas rule allowing a continuing exemption of the pro-
ceeds of sale for six months. 168 The debtor had filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 169 and no objection was raised
to his rural homestead claim. The homestead property was then sold.
Within six months the debtor bought an adjoining property, securing the
purchase-money note with the money received from the sale of the for-
mer homestead. The debtor then converted his bankruptcy to a Chapter
7 case and claimed the newly purchased property as his homestead. The
trustee objected in reliance on In re Bartlett.170 There, a Chapter 13 filing
preceded a conversion to Chapter 7, and the trustee was allowed to object
to the homestead claimed at the time of transfer. A conversion from a
Chapter 11 proceeding to one under Chapter 7 is significantly differ-
ent,171 however, and the trustee is not allowed a new objection on the
conversion. The new homestead bought with the proceeds of the initial
homestead within six months of sale, therefore, "did not somehow 're-
enter' the bankruptcy estate."' 72 The court went on to point out that the
proceeds of the sale of the first homestead not used to purchase the new
homestead lose their exempt status in bankruptcy. 73 Furthermore, the
note given by the buyer of the first homestead and used as security for
the purchase of the new homestead would lose its exempt status six
months after the sale.' 74
As the tracing of funds to an exempt source preserves their exempt
character for a time, tracing of funds used to purchase a homestead to a
wrongfully acquired source causes them to lose their exempt status. The
homestead cannot be used as a shield against a rightful owner's claim to
embezzled funds. In Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc.175 the wife's
employer brought suit against her and her husband for fraud and unjust
enrichment for the wife's embezzlement and sought the proceeds of the
sale of a homestead on which the purchase-money lien was discharged
165. Id. at 204-07.
166. Id. at 205.
167. 178 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
168. TEx. PROp. CODE. ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1109 (1988).
170. 149 B.R. 446 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
171. In re Williamson, 804 F.2d 1355, 1359 (5th Cir. 1986). See Taylor v. Freeland &
Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); 11 U.S.C. § 522 (I) (1988).
172. Reed, 178 B.R. at 709.
173. Id at 284. See In re England, 975 F.2d 1168, 1172-74 (5th Cir. 1992).
174. Reed, 178 B.R. at 709-10. If the note had been assigned to the seller, however, it
would have passed from the debtor. Ia4
175. 874 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
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with the employer's embezzled funds. Thus, the employer would have
been subrogated to the right of the prior lien holder.176 The trial court
rendered judgment against both spouses for fraud, unjust enrichment, ex-
emplary damages, and prejudgment interest. The husband appealed. De-
spite the court's reversal of the judgment against the husband for fraud
because he was not shown to have participated in or even to have known
of the wife's wrongful acts, the judgment for unjust enrichment was af-
firmed. The court evidently reasoned that the husband had been unjustly
enriched because the debt against the community home had been paid
with funds embezzled by his wife. But the husband should not have been
held personally liable because he was guilty of no tort. A judgment for a
community benefit need not be rendered against both spouses. If the
husband was not guilty of conversion, he was not unjustly enriched. The
husband's separate property is not subject to liability for the wife's tort,
but the personal judgment against him makes his separate property liable.
The whole community is nonetheless liable. 177 By imposing a construc-
tive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the homestead, the court specifi-
cally rejected the conclusion of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Curtis
Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover.178
The conversion of business premises into an urban homestead with
both residential and business homestead attributes was the underlying
subject of In re Julian.179 In 1969 the husband and the wife established a
rural homestead on the husband's separate property, and the husband
maintained an urban business on premises that were also his separate
property. In 1976 the husband mortgaged the business property to secure
a loan. After the wife commenced proceedings for a divorce in 1981, the
husband moved to an apartment on the urban premises. Thereafter he
improved the property substantially as a home. The prior lien on the
property was valid, however, because the family had maintained a rural
residential homestead at the time it was given.'tm From 1981 the business
property was the ex-husband's urban home. The ex-husband had allowed
his former wife to remain in the rural house with their minor children,
and in 1986 she took a lease of the rural house from him. She remarried
several years later and continued to live in the rural house. In 1984 the
ex-husband procured another loan with the business premises as collat-
eral and used part of the loan to discharge the prior lien on the property.
The holder of the note and deed of trust securing it brought suit for its
176. See infra note 223.
177. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1993).
178. 701 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Joseph W. Mc-
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw.LJ. 1, 23-24
(1986).
179. 163 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
180. See Farrington v. First Nat'l Bank, 753 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied); In re Nelson, 134 B.R. 838,844 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). For the
correlative situation, urban residential homestead and hence no allowance of a rural busi-
ness homestead, see Exall v. Security Mortgage & Trust Co., 39 S.W. 959, 960 (rex. Civ.
App.-Dallas, 1897, writ ref'd).
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enforcement. Though he actually resided in his urban residence, the ex-
husband had continued to claim the rural property as a homestead for ad
valorem tax purposes. Although an ad valorem tax declaration is evi-
dence of a homestead, it is not conclusive evidence 81 in a case such as
this one when actual homestead use was the best evidence of intent.18s
The urban premises were therefore the ex-husband's homestead, and the
lien on the property was consequentially unenforceable except insofar as
the borrowed funds were used to discharge the prior valid lien.183
Vackar v. Patterson, Boyd, Lowery, Alderholt & Paterson, P.C.'84 was
an appeal by a plaintiff from a summary judgment in favor of a judgment
creditor's attorney in a suit for wrongful execution on a condominium-
homestead. The debtor also sought to set aside a sheriff's deed in which
the property was misdescribed. 185 In reversing the judgment in favor of
the defendant, the appellate court said that the homestead claimant's
cause of action did not turn on the effectiveness of the conveyance.
In two strikingly similar Chapter 7 opinions' 86 rendered less than three
weeks apart the same judge reached an unduly restrictive interpretation
of the urban homestead. In In re Nerios187 a couple claimed an urban
homestead in two contiguous lots on each of which there was one house.
The first improved lot was purchased in 1968, and the second, in 1978.
During the fourteen years prior to 1992, the second house was always
occupied by relatives who were dependent on the property owners and
thus were members of the owners' family for homestead purposes.
188
The couple therefore were maintaining something akin to a family com-
pound. In 1992 the husband and wife separated and the wife moved else-
where for three months. The couple later reconciled but found that they
lived more happily if the husband stayed mainly in one house and the
wife in the other along with her dependent relatives. The couple main-
tained these living arrangements when they filed their petition for bank-
ruptcy. In the other case, In re Cate,189 the couple purchased and
181. Nelson, 134 B.R. at 845, citing Connelly v. Johnson, 259 S.W. 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1924, no writ).
182. Julian, 163 B.R. 471, citing In re Kennard, 970 F.2d 1455, 1459 (5th Cir. 1992),
citing Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Estoppel by contrary assertions of the homestead claimant
was not effectively argued against him because the lender was not shown to have relied on
such statements. Julian, 163 B.R. at 492-83. See also Patterson v. F.D.I.C. 918 F.2d 540
(5th Cir.1990) (Disclaimer in deed of trust does not preclude evidence that property mort-
gaged is a homestead.).
183. See infra note 223.
184. 866 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
185. The sheriff's deed described the condominium as "Unit 21" rather and "Unit 321"
and therefore transferred no interest in the plaintiff's property. Id at 818.
186. Some passages in the two decisions are identical.
187. 171 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
188. See Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (family consisting of divorced woman and her dependent mother); Central
Life Assurance Soc'y v. Gray, 32 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ ref'd)
(family consisting of brother and his dependent sister).
189. 170 B.R. 582 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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occupied a house in 1972. In 1973 they acquired another house directly
across the street, where they allowed the husband's dependant parents
and sister to live. When the husband filed for bankruptcy in 1993, the
husband still lived in the house, even though the wife had been in the
hospital for over a year; the husband's father still lived across the street
though his mother had died and his sister was in a nursing home.
In both cases the court limited the homestead exemption to the one
house and lot which the couple had occupied together. In both cases, the
court said that the homestead claimants had failed to discharge their bur-
den of showing that the family home extended beyond the lot on which
their principal living quarters stood. In both instances the combined two
lots seem to have measured far less than one acre and no business home-
stead appears to have been claimed. If a single mansion and adjoining
buildings on one acre had been claimed in each case there is little doubt
that the court would have found the proof of homestead sufficient. In
Nerios the court stated that "[the homestead] is not intended to include
two separate residences located on different lots." But the court went on
to say that two houses constructed on one lot may be unobjectionable. 190
The Texas Constitution refers to "a lot or lots" 191 occupied as the home-
stead of "a family."'192 What justifies this discriminatory attitude toward
proof of a homestead? Was it the trustee's argument in Nerios that "if
[those debtors] were successful in claiming two houses as their exempt
homestead, it will become common practice for spouses to claim two
homesteads in bankruptcy cases"? 193 In accordance with the constitu-
tional cap 194 the Legislature allows as a homestead an entire acre and its
improvements used as the urban residence of a family or a single adult.' 95
That area seems excessive in the minds of many and could be reduced by
the legislature.' 96 That area and use are nevertheless the present tests
and the number of structures or lots or conveyances or whether the area
is surrounded by a wall should be irrelevant.
In In re Osborn'97 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
an Oklahoma couple who had initially claimed an Oklahoma homestead
might amend their schedules to claim a Texas homestead. The wife, who
did not initially comprehend the meaning of a homestead claim, testified
that she felt she was required to aassert an Oklahoma home because they
had filed for a business reorganization in Oklahoma. Although the hus-
band had repeatedly claimed Oklahoma property as his homestead, the
appellate court held that he was not judicially estopped from claiming a
190. Id.(citing Tolman v. Overstreet, 590 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no
writ)).
191. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
192. Nerios, 171 B.R. at 226.
193. Id.
194. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
195. TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.002 (Vernon 1984).
196. "[N]ot more than one acre .... TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
197. 24 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1994).
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Texas homestead, 198 because Texas law does not allow one spouse to
change the homestead without the consent of the other.199 Because the
Texas house had been sold by the trustee prior to its being established as
the couple's homestead, on remand the Oklahoma bankruptcy court pro-
vided restitution for the loss of the homestead by a monetary award for
the proceeds received by a creditor to whom the proceeds were paid, less
expenses of sale, delinquent taxes, and an amount allowed to the couple
for the preservation of assets during the proceeding.2°°
D. LIENS ON HOMESTEAD
In two cases a divorce court imposed unconstitutional burdens on
homestead property. In Cole v. Cole20' the court ordered the husband to
execute a note in favor of the wife to achieve an equitable division of the
community estate, which could not be equitably divided in kind and im-
posed a lien on the homestead (awarded to the husband) to secure the
note. The note was not solely to secure the wife for her interest in the
homestead, 202 however, and the extent of the lien was therefore im-
proper.203 In Tschirhart v. Tschirhart2°4 the trial court ordered that the
community homestead be sold to pay an unsecured promissory note and
that the remainder be divided between the parties. The appellate court
excised the improper order of sale from the judgment.205
In two other cases a bankrupt ex-spouse sought unsuccessfully to re-
move a lien from a homestead under section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 206 In In re Bradford207 the divorce court had awarded the commu-
nity homestead to the wife and had granted the husband a money judg-
ment for his community share secured by a lien on the entire property
awarded to the wife, who then sought to remove the lien in her bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The court held under Farrey v. Sanderfoot208 that be-
cause the bankrupt took her sole interest in the homestead property at
198. Id. at 1208-09.
199. Id. TEX. CONSr. art. XVI, § 51. On remand the bankruptcy court gave effect to
the Texas homestead claim. In re Osborn, 176 B.R. 941, 949 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
The Texas homestead, however, was sold pending the appeal and it was asserted that the
sale precluded the appeal. The appellate court rejected that contention. Osborn, F.3d at
1203-04.
200. In re Osborn, 176 B.R. 941, 944 & 949 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
201. 880 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
202. Id. at 484-85.
203. The appellate court therefore remanded the case for redivision of the community
property and to repair a further error in the judgment. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731
(Tex. 1985); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976).
204. 876 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
205. Id at 509. In proceeding to divide the proceeds by ordering the husband to pay 60
percent of the balance due on the note and the wife to pay 40 percent, however, the appel-
late court exceeded its function, and the case should have been remanded to the trial court.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
207. 166 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994).




the same time the lien attached, the lien could not be removed under
section 522(f).
In In re Buffington209 the situation was somewhat different. At close of
the trial the divorce court had orally awarded the husband the community
homestead and had ordered him to pay all liability against the property.
The court awarded the wife a judgment (with interest) for her community
share of the couple's equity in the property and put a lien on the property
for the judgment and interest in favor of the wife.210 Prior to the entry of
the order of divorce, however, the wife executed a special warranty deed
of her interest in the homestead to her husband and he executed a note
and deed of trust to her for her interest. The opinion does not relate how
the order ultimately read, but the bankruptcy court interpreted the lien as
being judicially imposed on the homestead before or at the same time
that the debtor had acquired that interest.21' Thus, applying the rule in
Farrey, which does not allow removal of a judicial lien unless fixed on
homestead after acquisition, the lien protecting the interest of the ex-wife
could not be removed.212
The bankruptcy court went on to say, however, that though the ex-wife
would be able to enforce her lien properly acquired against the property,
her lien under Texas law extended only to her undivided half-interest in
the property conveyed by her to her husband. 213 Because the husband
already had a homestead interest in his undivided half, he was constitu-
tionally forbidden to put a lien on his half under Texas law.214 Lenders
who are accustomed to taking a lien on an entire property when a bor-
rower seeks a loan to buy an undivided one-half of it from a divorcing
spouse are alarmed by this judicial observation as though it constitutes a
new revelation that totally undermines their position. Although the en-
forceable security of lenders has not been altered, their imagined security
and thus their position for audits by federal authorities may have been
detrimentally affected by this realization of their actual position. With
respect to foreclosure, lenders may also encounter longer delays and
some greater expense than those to which they had evidently become
accustomed. In the case of all but the largest of urban residential home-
steads that may be subject to partition in kind, the holder of a lien on an
undivided one-half of an urban homestead property can sue for partition
and for foreclosure on that one-half in anticipation that partition can be
achieved only by sale of the property and partition of the proceeds.
209. 167 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
210. The lien on the bankrupt's share was thus in the nature of a purchase-money lien
and valid under Texas law. As to the non-bankrupt, former spouse's share, the fixing of
the lien would have thus been res judicata in a subsequent dispute.
211. Buffington, 167 B.R. at 836 n.3. The court pointed out that "an equitable lien can
be a judicial lien," id., indicating that the court regarded the lien as a judicial lien. 11
U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988) (authorizing a bankruptcy court to remove "a judicial lien" impair-
ing the homestead of a debtor).
212. Buffington, 167 B.R. at 836.
213. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984).
214. Buffington, 167 B.R. at 836.
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Hence, the lender may seek to negotiate some additional compensation
for the expense of foreclosure in making loans for the acquisition of a
spouse's undivided interest in homestead property, but the loss of a
greater apparent security in the bank's records is the real inconvenience.
Courts twice considered a lender's subrogation to a lienholder on a
homestead when the lender advanced money to discharge an existing
lien. In Crowder v. Benchmark Bank215 the Internal Revenue Service
had fixed a lien for a husband's delinquent taxes on realty which included
his urban homestead and an additional unsegregated area.2 16 The hus-
band and his wife joined in borrowing money from a bank to discharge
the lien and agreed in writing that the bank would be subrogated to the
rights of the holder of the prior lien. When the loan was not repaid, the
bank brought suit to foreclose its contractual lien. The appellate court
held that a lien on a homestead for purposes not allowed by the Texas
Constitution2 17 can be imposed only by the federal government and can
be enforced only by the federal government. 218 The court, therefore,
concluded that it is contrary to public policy to allow a lender to be subro-
gated to the federal lienholder. The court also held that the bank was
foreclosed from forcing a sale of the non-exempt, unsegregated portion of
the land even though the bank's lien on that area was undisputed. 219 The
court rejected the precedents relied on by the bank 220 because they were
decided prior to the 1983 amendments to the homestead provisions of the
Texas Constitution22 1 and the 1987 amendments to chapter 41 of the
Property Code. 222 The court, however, failed to identify the aspects of
those provisions that had altered prior authorities.
In In re Julian the court held that when a third person uses borrowed
money to discharge a constitutionally valid lien on homestead property
with the consent of the homeowner, the lender is subrogated to the rights
of the discharged lienor.223 In this instance, the lien extended to non-
homestead property as well as the homestead, but the terms of the loan
made no provision for the allocation of principal payments between the
two properties. Relying on Wingate v. People's Building & Loan Savings
215. 889 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
216. The land was presumably community property subject to the husband's sole or
joint management or possibly his separate property.
217. TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50.
218. Crowder, 889 S.W.2d at 529.
219. Id. at 530.
220. Means v. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lewis v. Investors Sav. Ass'n, 411 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1967, no writ); Mazow v. Brazle, 337 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960,
no writ).
221. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 57.
222. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-41.004 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
223. Julian, 163 B.R. at 484 (citing Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275, 3 S.W. 273 (1887)); First
Nat'l Bank v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315, 8 S.W. 45 (1888). See also Dillon v. Kauffman &
Runge, 58 Tex. 696 (1883).
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Association,224 the court held that principal payments should be made
first to extinguish the homestead lien.225
The traditional view has been that a lien attempted to be imposed on a
homestead for a purpose not allowed by the Texas Constitution226 is
void. 227 In recent years, however, it has sometimes been said that a lien
fixed by compliance with the statutory requirement for abstracting a
judgment against the homeowner actually puts a lien on a homestead, but
it is unenforceable. 228 In In re Henderson229 a couple who had been de-
nied a discharge nevertheless moved the bankruptcy court to avoid a judi-
cial lien on their homestead in reliance on section 522(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code.230 The bankruptcy court followed the traditional view
that there was no lien to remove and denied the motion. 231 On appeal
the district judge granted the relief sought but couched his reasoning in
traditional terms of removing a cloud from the debtor's title, which the
lien impaired. 232 On further appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that by its terms Property Code section 52.001233 fixes a lien on all
realty of the debtor, and if it thereby puts a cloud on the debtor's home-
stead title (as it did in the case before the court), section 522(f)(1) may be
used to avoid it.234 In providing an amendment to section 522(f)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code235 to define instances when a lien impairs an exemp-
tion, legislative history indicates the situation in Henderson as one to
which the amendment is meant to apply.2 36
224. 15 Tex. Civ. App. 416, 39 S.W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1897, no writ).
225. Julian, 163 B.R. at 487.
226. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 states:
The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby
protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the
purchase money thereof or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due
thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements
thereon .... No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall
ever be valid, except for the purchase money for, or improvements made
thereon ....
Hence, a court cannot award the proceeds of sale of a homestead to satisfy creditors except
in those instances specified. In re Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1994, n.w.h.).
227. See, e.g., Julian, 163 B.R. at 483.
228. See Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973); Harms v. Ehlers, 179 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd). See also Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
229. 18 F.3d 1305 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
230. 11 U.S.C. 522(0(1) (1988).
231. 155 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
232. Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1308. The district court explained that allowing a debtor
relief in this situation furthers the objective of bankruptcy to allow the debtor to gain a
fresh start in his financial life. In re Henderson, 168 B.R. 151, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1993). The explanation seems anomalous in light of the fact that the debtors had been
denied a discharge.
233. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
234. Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1310-1311. The court relied heavily on Tarrant Bank v.
Miller, 833 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
235. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(0(2) (West Supp. 1995).
236. H.R. REP. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 53 (1994) (discussing H.R. 5116).
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To protect the homestead from unauthorized mortgages the Texas Con-
stitution237 provides that a transaction structured as a sale but intended as
a mortgage is void. In Ketcham v. First National Bank of New Boston238
the appellate court reversed the adjudication on a summary judgment for
a lender in a suit by a homestead claimant against the lender for fraud.
According to summary judgment evidence offered by the widowed home-
stead claimant, her son had sought a loan from the bank. The bank had
responded that more collateral than that offered by the borrower was
needed and asked if the son's parents would "sell" their home to the son
to be used as collateral. The bank had allegedly stated that this aspect of
the transaction would not constitute a real sale but the transaction was a
necessary step in achieving the loan.239 The bank then lent money to the
son to buy the parents' home as part of the loan transaction, which had
been prepared by the bank's attorney. At the closing the bank presented
a check to the parents for the amount of the loan sought by the son. The
parents endorsed the check to their son. The court held that the sum-
mary judgment evidence offered by the widowed parent raised a question
of fact that the transaction was a sham mortgage on the homestead and
that summary judgment was therefore improperly granted by the trial
court.
2 4 0
The Texas Supreme Court held in Inwood North Homeowners' Associ-
ation v. Harris24' that a lien for maintenance agreed to with a homeown-
ers' association prior to homestead designation by a homeowner is
constitutionally valid. In Boudreaux Civic Association v. Cox 242 a home-
owners' association had obtained a money judgment for attorney's fees in
an action against a homeowner for violation of a subdivision's deed re-
strictions. Although the Property Code 243 allows parties to agree that the
prevailing party in an action based on violation of a deed restriction is
entitled to attorney's fees, the Association's rules did not include such a
provision. The proceeding against a homestead for recovery in this in-
stance was therefore precluded. 2"4 In the court's understanding of In-
wood North Homeowner's Association, however, if the provision allowing
enforcement of attorney's fees had been in the homeowners' association's
rules prior to the member's establishing his homestead, the association
might have proceeded against the homestead for recovery of attorney's
fees.
237. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50: "All pretended sales of the homestead involving any
condition of defeasance shall be void."
238. 875 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
239. Id. at 755.
240. Id. at 756.
241. 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987), discussed in McKnight, 1988 Annual Survey, supra
note 94, at 34-35.
242. 882 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
243. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.006(a) (Vernon 1984).
244. Boudreaux Civic Ass'n, 882 S.W.2d at 551.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in First Gibraltar Bank v.
Morales245 that with respect to reverse annuity mortgages and line of
credit conversion mortgages (a variant of reverse annuity mortgages) pro-
vided by federal statute and regulations, 246 Texas homestead law is pre-
empted insofar247 as it prohibits liens on homestead property for other
types of loans than those prescribed in the Texas Constitution. 248 The
decision constituted a serious inroad on the Texas homestead doctrine
that homestead owners could not use their homestead equity as collateral
for ordinary borrowing. With writ of certiorari pending before the
Supreme Court of the United States, an opportunity for a congressional
solution of the problem was suddenly presented. Banks throughout the
country were extremely anxious to achieve passage of a banking reform
act before the end of the 103d Congress, and Congressman Henry B.
Gonzalez of San Antonio, the Chairman of the Committee on Banking,
Financial & Urban Affairs in the House of Representatives, was particu-
larly anxious to undo the effect of the First Gibraltar Bank case.
Although Senator Philip Gramm supported Texas banks in attempting to
ward off this result, Chairman Gonzalez was successful in his effort to
amend the Homeowners' Loan Act and the Parity Act to reverse the pre-
emption effects of those acts.249 After the United States Supreme Court
had declined to review the decision,250 the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the new legislation had achieved its purpose constitutionally.251
E. LIEN STRIPPING
Over most of the last century the purchase of a home was regarded as
one of the safest investments, in most times appreciating in value and
secure against all creditors except those specifically enumerated in the
Texas Constitution. 252 In recent years, however, such an investment has
not always been safe and many homeowners in bankruptcy have found
245. 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1994), rev'g, First Gibraltar Bank v. Morales, 815 F. Supp.
1008 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
246. Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468c; Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a-1464; 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06
(formerly designated as the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982); 43 Fed.
Reg. 59,336 (1978); 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(a)(2) (1982); 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.1-2 (1984). Texas could have opted out of the preemption provisions of the Parity
Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3804, but failed to do so. First Gibraltar Bank, 19 F.3d at 1043-44.
See James W. Paulsen, Forum [on the Home Equity Controversy], 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 307
(1995).
247. An uneasiness that this result might be reached was expressed in McKnight, 1991
Annual Survey, supra note 37.
248. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. See supra note 226. See also Julia P. Forrester, Mort-
gaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion
of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REv. 373 (1994).
249. The Home Owners' Loan Act was amended to state that no provision of the Act
"shall be construed as superseding any homestead provisions of any State constitution."
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat.
2338 (1994) (to be codified at § 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f)).
250. First Gibraltar Bank v. Morales, cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 204 (1994).
251. First Gibraltar Bank v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 1995).
252. TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50.
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themselves with a lien on their homesteads exceeding their equity.
Though some have tried to strip down their indebtedness to the value of
their homestead properties at the date of discharge, their efforts have
been unsuccessful. 253 Another fruitless attempt at stripping down indebt-
edness to the value of homestead property was made in In re Doviak.254
There the bankrupt couple had been discharged from bankruptcy with
undischarged federal tax liabilities imposing a lien on their homestead
which exceeded its current value. The couple moved for discharge of the
amount of the indebtedness that exceeded the value of the property, ar-
guing that prior authorities applied only to consensual liens. The bank-
ruptcy court denied their motion. 255 In light of these authorities some
hoped for legislative relief but none was forthcoming from the last session
of Congress. 256
F. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
With respect to personal property, however, federal exemptions for
bankruptcy purposes were doubled by the 1994 congressional amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, 257 and in some cases, that change may
make the choice of federal exemptions more appealing for Texas debtors.
With respect to agricultural debtors, Congress defied negative predic-
tions258 by amending section 522(f)(3)(B) 259 to preclude the removal of
nonpossessory and nonpurchase-money liens on tools of trade, imple-
ments, farm animals, and crops for amounts exceeding $5000.260
The familial status of the debtor determines the extent of a personal
property exemption.261 In In re Coffnan262 the bankrupt debtor was a
widow whose children were adults and not dependent on her. For home-
stead purposes the widow's standing as a family member does not change
253. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993) (a chapter 13 case); Dew-
snup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1994) (a chapter 7 case).
254. 161 B.R. 379 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
255. Id. at 379-80.
256. The proposals for reform are summarized and refuted as disruptive to the credit
market by Jane K. Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobleman, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 541, 576-85
(1994).
257. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West Supp. 1995). Debt limits for the availability of bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code were also increased from a maximum of
$100,000 of unsecured debt to $250,000 and from $350,000 of secured debt to $750,000. 11
U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West Supp. 1995).
258. See McKnight, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 33, 1180.
259. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1995).
260. The category of items to which this amendment applies also extends to profes-
sional books, so the lawyer-farmer is put in particular jeopardy. These limitations apply
only when the debtor chooses state rather than federal exemptions, and a correlative
amendment to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995) was enacted in
1993 in anticipation of the passage of the congressional enactment. See McKnight, 1994
Annual Survey, supra note 33, at 1180.
261. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon Supp. 1995): $60,000 a family and
$30,000 for a single adult not otherwise protected.
262. 163 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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as a result of the children's ceasing to be dependents. 263 The court, there-
fore, concluded that the same test is applicable in determining familial
status for the purpose of claiming personal property exemptions.264
In In re Legg265 the court traced the liberalization of legislative and
judicial attitudes toward the exempt character of tools of trade over two
decades. As a consequence of the enactment of broadened statutory pro-
visions relating to tools of trade, the notion that such tools must be pecu-
liarly adapted to a debtor's business or used by hand 266 has been
abandoned in favor of an interpretation that comprises equipment of a
general nature used in a trade or profession. 267 The 1991 amendments to
the personal property exemption law were notable in including motor ve-
hicles as tools of trade.268
In In re Shurley269 the bankrupt couple and their trustee in bankruptcy
disputed the fair market value of the debtors' furs and jewelry. 270 The
trustee attacked the debtors' valuations as too low by producing evidence
of the debtors' admissions of higher values but failed to offer evidence of
expert opinion as to actual values. The trustee, therefore, failed in his
burden of proof to refute the debtors' specific valuations.271
In Shurley the debtors also claimed life insurance policies as exempt
and asserted that their cash surrender value need not be included within
the $60,000 personal property limitation of the Property Code272 as en-
acted in 1991. The court sustained the debtors' position. Insurance Code
article 21.22,273 also enacted in 1991, provides unlimited exemptions of
life insurance policies and therefore supersedes the limitations of the
Property Code.274 The trustee also argued that the 1991 amendment to
the Insurance Code violates either the Commerce Clause275 or the Bank-
ruptcy Clause 276 of the United States Constitution in that these clauses
establish some sort of federal preemption. The court concluded that both
263. Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929); Chisholm v.
Mills, 250 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd).
264. Coffman, 163 B.R. at 786.
265. 164 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
266. McMillan v. Dean, 174 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
267. Legg, 164 B.R. at 72-73. A chapter 13 debtor is entitled to possession of exempt
property, but the mechanic who has repaired the debtor's property is entitled to protection
of his secured interest by order of the court. In re Deiss, 166 B.R. 92, 94 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1994).
268. Legg, 164 B.R. at 72.
269. 163 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1988).
271. Shurley, 163 B.R. at 291. In another valuation dispute, the court held that a debtor
was collaterally estopped from relitigating the valuation of inherited property in a bank-
ruptcy case after a stipulated value of the property had been established in litigation before
the Tax Court. In re Cluck, 165 B.R. 1005, 1009-10 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
272. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
273. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1995)
274. Shurley, 163 B.R. at 293-94. See McKnight, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 33, at
1181-82.
275. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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arguments were inapposite. The trustee, however, might have made a
more cogent argument that the Contract Clause precludes the broadening
of exemptions after a debt is incurred.277
In re Young 278 required a more extensive examination of the applica-
bility of the 1991 amendments to the personal property exemption law.
The debtor's claim for exemptions included proceeds of an insurance pol-
icy on the life of the debtor's deceased husband deposited in life insur-
ance access accounts, as well as the accrued interest on those insurance
proceeds. After making a thorough review of the history of article 21.22
of the Insurance Code279 and its overriding effect on the exemption pro-
vision of the Property Code 280 relating to life insurance policies, the court
rejected the contention that the insurance proceeds, once paid, became
nonexempt cash. "It would be a meaningless gesture for the Legislature
to grant an exemption for the proceeds only to deny the exemption once
the benefit is realized by the intended beneficiary."' 281 The court found
that the purpose underlying article 21.22 is
... to provide support. In most cases, the benefits of an insurance
policy substitute for the future support that the insured would have
provided to his beneficiary had the contingency giving rise to the
payment of benefits not taken place. Allowing these insurance pro-
ceeds to earn interest only serves to increase the funds upon which
the beneficiary can rely for support by way of natural increase and as
a method to withstand inflationary pressures in the economy.282
The court, therefore, held that the insurance proceeds and the earned
interest in the access account were exempt. 283 With respect to the value
of an insurance policy on the debtor's own life for the benefit of her chil-
dren, the court in Young reasoned that article 21.22284 again prevailed.285
The court followed 286 the analysis of In re Shurley287 in preference to that
of In re Bowes.288
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also relied on article 21.22 of the
Insurance Code to support an exemption in In re Walden.289 The debtor
had been employed in a family business. The corporation, which bought
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 607 (1877); Gunn v.
Barry, 82 U.S. 610, 623-24 (1872). See also McKnight, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 33,
at 1174.
278. 166 B.R. 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
279. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
280. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
281. Young, 166 B.R. at 858.
282. Id. at 860.
283. Id.
284. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
285. Because both of her children were emancipated, self-supporting adults and thus
not dependent on her for support, the debtor could not claim an exemption under TEx.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
286. Young, 166 B.R. at 861 n.9.
287. 163 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
288. 160 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), criticized as wrongly decided in McKnight,
1994 Annual Survey, supra note 33, at 1181-82.
289. 12 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 1994), rev'g, 144 B.R. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
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the business, agreed to employ the debtor under terms of a non-competi-
tion agreement to extend for forty years. The following year he was put
on indefinite leave and payments under the agreement ceased. After the
discharged employee brought suit for breach, the parties entered into a
settlement by which an annuity was provided in lieu of the contract of
employment. In his bankruptcy that ensued three years later, the debtor
claimed the annuity as an exempt asset under the provisions of article
21.22 that allows an exemption for benefits received "under any plan or
program of annuities and benefits in use by any employer. '290 In finding
for the debtor the court rejected291 the trustee's reliance on a decision
involving an annuity for attorney's fees received in settlement of a per-
sonal injury case.292
Section 42.0021 of the Property Code provides that a debtor's rights in
a variety of retirement devices are exempt "unless the plan, contract, or
account does not qualify under the applicable provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986."293 The bankrupt debtor in In re Youngblood294
claimed an individual retirement account as exempt property under that
section. The account in question, however, had accepted a contribution
from a terminated pension plan in favor of the debtor. That pension plan
had been twice determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be
qualified under the Internal Revenue Code, but the plan had been termi-
nated after being assessed sanctions by the IRS for violation of certain
IRS rules. The debtor took the position that the determination of
whether the plan was qualified was properly made by the IRS. The bank-
ruptcy court, however, followed the argument of an objecting creditor
that the bankruptcy court has the authority to make its own determina-
tion in that regard and denied the exemption in light of the subsequent
IRS sanctions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Texas
Legislature intended that Texas courts should defer to the IRS in deter-
mining whether a plan is qualified under the Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, the plan had been determined to be qualified and the assets on
deposit in the account were exempt.295
In Bergman v. Bergman296 an ex-wife who had been awarded alimony
in the settlement of a Connecticut divorce proceeding brought suit under
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 297 and obtained a
Texas judgment. Though neither party was a domiciliary of Texas, the ex-
husband was served with process in Texas while here on business. Pursu-
290. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.22, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
291. See Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439, 234 S.W.2d 410, 413-14 (1950).
292. In re Young, 866 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1987). The court also distinguished Daniels v.
Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2944 (1993). As to the latter, see McKnight, 1993 Annual Survey,
supra note 53, at 1501.
293. TEX. PROP. CODE. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
294. 29 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1994).
295. Youngblood, 29 F.3d at 229.
296. 888 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, n.w.h.).
297. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-35.008 (Vernon 1986).
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ant to her Texas judgment, the ex-wife was granted an order against the
ex-husband to turnover retirement benefits from his Texas employer.
Although the couple's property settlement agreement provided that Con-
necticut law should govern all aspects of the agreement, the court held
that the Texas law of exemptions applied to enforcement of the Texas
judgments and, therefore, precluded turnover of Texas exempt
property. 298
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
A. DIVORCE PROCEDURE
In Dawson-Austin v. Austin299 the husband and wife, who had previ-
ously been domiciliaries of Minnesota and had apparently moved to Cali-
fornia, separated in early 1992. The wife brought suit for divorce in
California but did not get service of process until six months later. In the
meantime the husband, who had established a domicile in Texas and had
resided here for over six months, filed suit for divorce and obtained ser-
vice of process on his wife in California before she served him with notice
of her California proceeding. The wife moved to abate the Texas suit.
The appellate court held that the wife's unreasonably long delay in failing
to give notice of her California suit supported the trial court's exercise of
discretion in denying her motion.300
The California court, nevertheless, had proceeded with the wife's case.
The wife then filed for bankruptcy in California, and the California di-
vorce court reserved jurisdiction to divide the community estate but
granted the divorce. At that time, the trial of the husband's suit for di-
vorce was proceeding in Texas, but the wife made no plea of res judicata
to the Texas court. Thus, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the Texas
court did not err in granting a divorce.301
Domicile is a jurisdictional requirement for divorce. Residence in the
state or a particular county of the state is a venue requirement for bring-
ing suit and is not jurisdictional. 30 2 In Cook v. Mayfield303 there was a
sharp difference of opinion on the evidence of residence. The wife filed
suit for divorce in McLennan County, and the husband filed a plea in
abatement alleging that the wife had not been a resident of the county for
ninety days preceding filing as required by section 3.21. 304 Though the
298. Bergman, 888 S.W.2d at 585.
299. Dawson-Austin, 1995 WL 1680 at *1.
300. Idt at *6 (citing Reed v. Reed, 311 S.W.2d 678, 631 (Tex. 1958) (delay of 15
months)) and (distinguishing Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974) (delay of 23
days)). Though the wife had sought to appear specially under TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a to
contest personal jurisdiction of the Texas court over her, the court found that her efforts
failed. Dawson-Austin, 1995 WL 1680 at *4.
301. Id at *9.
302. Cook v. Mayfield, 886 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, n.w.h.); Harmon v.
Harmon, 879 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
303. 886 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, n.w.h.).
304. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1992).
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wife had apparently grown up in McLennan County and had maintained
a room in her mother's house there where her son lived, she had lived in
Williamson County in 1990 and after her marriage, with her husband in
apartments in Williamson and Travis Counties until they bought a home
in Travis County in March 1994. The husband admitted that his wife
spent fifty to seventy nights in Waco apart from him before she left for
Waco in late July 1994 and filed for divorce in McLennan County twelve
days later. The trial judge therefore ruled in favor of her McLennan
County residence and his ruling was supported by the dissenting judge on
appeal, but the majority of the appellate court regarded his conclusion as
an abuse of discretion. 30 5
Practice is still very uneven with respect to judicial willingness to order
interim attorney's fees under Family Code section 3.58(c). 306 At the
hearing on interim fees in Post v. Garza,30 7 the court refused to allow the
husband to cross-examine the wife's attorney or to put on evidence but
ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney interim fees of $15,000.
The appellate court held that the trial court's statement that the award
was subject to a later showing that the amount was unreasonable and
would be subject to refund was "a meaningless acknowledgment that it is
in fact an interlocutory order. '30 8 Although section 3.58(g) states that
such an order is not subject to interlocutory appeal, it is subject to a writ
of mandamus.30 9
Temporary orders of the trial court in a Harris County divorce suit pro-
voked two decisions on writs of habeas corpus. In Ex parte Delcourt310
the Houston First District Court of Appeals addressed the husband's
complaints concerning the trial court's first commitment order. The wife
had charged her husband with eighty-eight counts of contempt with cu-
mulative penalties for non-compliance amounting to forty-four years of
imprisonment. The husband was not informed of his right to jury trial,
but the statute does not authorize imprisonment for more than six
months, and for his contempt the husband was ordered confined for less
than six months. The court held that because contempt of court is a petty
offense when the penalty actually imposed does not exceed six months,311
the United States Constitution does not require allowance of trial by
jury.312 The trial court had also ordered the husband to make monthly
payments on a car-note as agreed by the parties. On his wife's showing
that he had failed to make payments for three months, the husband had
been jailed for contempt. The court held that the husband was entitled to
305. Cook, 886 S.W.2d at 842-43; cf id at 843-44 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
306. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995). The section specifically
requires "notice and hearing" of a motion to order payment of such fees. Id.
307. 867 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
308. Id. at 89 n.1.
309. Id. at 90 n.2.
310. 868 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), aff'd per curiam, 888
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1994).
311. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon 1988).
312. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).
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be discharged because the order amounted to imprisonment for debt.313
The court noted, however, that if the payment had been designated as for
temporary support, a different result might have been reached. 314
While the first petition was before the Houston Court of Appeals, the
trial judge signed a second commitment order for contempt of other or-
ders without any additional notice or hearing, and the contemnor brought
a second petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of
Texas. 315 The court declared the second order invalid on alternative
grounds. If considered as a new commitment not ordered as a conse-
quence of the first hearing, the order had been issued without notice and
hearing and was void for denial of due process of law. 316 Alternatively, if
the second commitment order had been issued as a result of the first con-
tempt hearing, then no written commitment order was signed sufficiently
close to the time that the judge pronounced the contempt to satisfy due
process requirements. 31 7
In granting a writ of habeas corpus in Ex parte Chunn,318 the court held
that an order to provide health insurance to a wife made prior to entry of
a written decree of divorce constitutes a temporary order and disobedi-
ence of the order is subject to the pressures of civil contempt and punish-
ment by imprisonment for up to six months in jail. But commitment to
jail for failure to comply with the order without assessing the period of
confinement and without defining the consequences of failure to comply
constituted punishment without due process of law.3
19
The purpose of Rule 215.5,320 requiring identification of witnesses
thirty days before trial, is to avoid ambush at trial. In Ramirez v. Rami-
rez321 the trial court allowed the wife to testify although she had not iden-
tified herself as a potential fact witness. Ordinarily good cause must be
shown for allowing an unidentified witness to testify. The court first ob-
served that there is less reason to apply the rule in the case of a party to a
divorce suit than with respect to other witnesses.3 22 In overruling the
husband's point of error, the court also justified its conclusion by saying
that in a suit for divorce
there is, or should be, a presumption that both husband and wife
have knowledge of relevant facts pertaining to the marriage ....
Allowing a party to a divorce suit ... to testify despite his or her
failure to identify him - or herself - as a fact witness would not
313. Delcourt, 868 S.W.2d at 373, 375 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18).
314. Whitt v. Whitt, 684 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ).
315. Delcourt, 888 S.W.2d at 811.
316. Id. at 812.
317. Id.
318. 881 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
319. Id. at 917.
320. TEX. R. COv. P. 215.5.
321. 873 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, n.w.h.).
322. Id. at 739.
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likely serve as a surprise to the other.., and cannot be considered as
a return to trial by ambush.323
If a defendant fails to file an answer to a plaintiff's complaint or peti-
tion, Rule 239324 allows the plaintiff or petitioner to take judgment on his
pleadings though an asserted right to unliquidated damages must be
proved, and in the case of divorce or annulment, the petitioner must es-
tablish his grounds for relief under section 3.53 of the Family Code. 325 In
either of the latter cases, however, the plaintiff or petitioner need not give
his defaulting opponent notice of the time of the hearing. Although some
of its more precise language was dropped from former section 3.64326
when Title 1 of the Family Code was amended in 1973, the draftsmen's
commentary presented to the Legislature stated that the omission does
not relieve the petitioner for divorce of proving his or her grounds for
divorce whether or not the respondent files a contest. This requirement
implements the state's policy that a marriage should not be put aside
lightly and that the petitioner must discharge the burden of proof.327
There is, nevertheless, language about default judgments in decisions of
some appellate courts that may seem to depart from this long-established
requirement,328 dating to the Divorce Act of 1841.329 Such language re-
occurs in Harmon v. Harmon,330 but the stricture of section 3.53 were
nonetheless complied with regardless of the respondent's failure to file an
answer.
331
In Harmon the wife had filed a petition for divorce in Harris County on
May 4 and on June 24 filed an amended petition. The respondent failed
to file an answer, which was due on August 10. On August 14 the associ-
ate judge announced that the divorce was granted, after hearing evidence
on the petition but without noting that the amended petition had not
been on file for sixty days. On September 18, however, the referring
court approved the judgment and signed the decree. After his motion for
new trial was overruled and after he had missed the deadline for filing an
appeal, the husband filed a writ of error. The appellate court rejected the
appellant's argument that the sixty days waiting period prescribed by sec-
323. Id. at 740.
324. TEX. R. Civ. P. 239.
325. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.53 (Vernon 1992).
326. Id. § 3.64. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to Title I of the Family Code, 21
TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 988 (1990) [hereinafter McKnight, Commentary to Title I - Family
Code]. See Joseph W. McKnight, supra note 5, at 342.
327. McKnight, Commentary to Title 1 - Family Code, supra note 326, at 988.
328. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 717 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ)
(grounds for divorce were not in issue, only domicile and residence requirements); cf Con-
sidine v. Considine, 726 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ) (dictum that
material allegations in a divorce petition must be proven by petition though respondent
failed to answer).
329. 1840-1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 19, § 4 at 20; 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483,
484 (1898).
330. 879 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
331. In professional slang this process is often referred to as a divorce "prove-up."
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tion 3.60332 makes a suit contested until that time has passed 333 under
Rule 245. 334 The sixty days waiting period merely precludes judgment of
divorce before that time has run.335 Although the associate judge had
purported to grant the divorce on August 14, the associate judge did not
have the power to render judgment but only to recommend judgment.
Thus, the divorce was not granted until September 18, well after the sixty
days had run.
The facts of Turner v. Ward336 are reminiscent of the New Mexico
phase of Oliver v. Oliver.337 The husband had allegedly used fraud to
procure a waiver of citation from his wife and had been granted a divorce
without her appearance. Two weeks after the entry of the decree the
husband was killed. After some sparring the trial court affirmed the de-
cree, and the wife filed a motion for new trial. The judge overruled the
wife's motion, and she appealed. The appellate court held that when a
party dies after the decree is entered, the cause does not abate for moot-
ness,338 but the court acknowledged that an appeal may abate in such a
case.339 Even so, the court went on to hold that an appeal is not mooted
if the marital status of the parties will significantly affect their property
rights.340 The court relied on Dunn v. Dunn,341 in which the Texas
Supreme Court allowed the appeal to proceed.342 In this instance the
court granted a motion for new trial343 but added "that on remand, the
case is abated and should be dismissed" due to the husband's death.3 "4
The dispute in Cook v. Cook345 also turned on the proper exercise of
the judge's plenary powers within thirty days of judgment. After render-
ing oral judgment for divorce and division of property, the trial court en-
tered a written judgment that somewhat altered the terms of the oral
judgment with respect to property division. The written judgment, there-
fore, was rendered within the trial court's power to make such a
modification.346
332. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.60 (Vernon 1992).
333. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245 requires at least 45 days notice of a first setting for trial.
334. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d at 215. A respondent appearing specially, however, has the
responsibility to make a timely request for a hearing or else he waives his special appear-
ance. Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
But having answered, the respondent is entitled to notice of the trial setting on the peti-
tioner's cause of action under Rule 245. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d at 154.
335. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d at 215.
336. No. 08-93-00313-CV, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2710 (Tex. App.-EI Paso, Nov. 3,
1994, n.w.h.).
337. 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994). See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
338. Turner, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2710, at *7.
339. Id.
340. Id. at *9. If division of property is in issue, marital status will inevitably affect
those property rights. If custody of minor children is alone in issue, property rights would
not be in issue. Id.
341. 439 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. 1969).
342. Id.
343. Turner, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2710, at *14.
344. Id. at *14 n. 6.
345. 888 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
346. Id. at 132.
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B. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
In In re Banks347 the wife had sued her husband for divorce and had
joined his wholly owned corporation as a co-respondent. The parties sub-
mitted their disputes to mediation and a written settlement was reached.
The wife then filed a written notice of repudiation of the agreement on
the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation of facts in the inducement of
the settlement. The husband and the corporation moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted their motion. On the wife's appeal, the
appellate court held that granting the motion was proper in light of the
wife's failure to assert facts in support of her allegation.348
In Stein v. Stein349 the wife sought to withdraw her consent to a prop-
erty settlement incident to divorce. The parties had agreed that their dis-
pute would be tried before an associate judge, had announced their
agreement in open court, and had dictated its terms into the record with
the approval of the associate judge. Prior to the approval of the agree-
ment by the referring divorce court, however, the wife revoked her con-
sent. As in Harmon,350 the appellate court held the associate judge lacks
power to enter judgment, and, therefore, under Family Code section
3.631 351the wife might withdraw from the settlement agreement at any
time before rendition of judgment by the divorce court. 352
C. MAKING THE DIVISION
An appellate court will not remand a division of community property
on divorce unless the trial court has mischaracterized marital property35 3
or has abused its discretion in dividing the community estate. 354 In Rami-
rez v. Ramirez355 the appellate court found that the trial court in making
an award of a money judgment to the wife in lieu of certain community
property in the husband's possession had included the value of two items
of property in the wife's possession which the court had already awarded
to her. To avoid this double recovery of property by the wife, the appel-
late court recomputed the value of the property in the husband's posses-
sion and corrected the judgment for the monetary award.356 Thus, in the
court's view, the need for remand to the trial court for a redivision of the
property was avoided because there was no error in characterization of
347. 887 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
348. Id at 163. See Ames v. Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590,593 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no
writ).
349. 868 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
350. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d at 215 and supra notes 330-37.
351. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon 1992).
352. Stein, 868 S.W.2d at 904.
353. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 731.
354. Cook v. Cook, 888 S.W.2d 130, 132 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
355. 873 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1994, no writ).
356. Id. at 742-43.
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property, 357 but merely a miscalculation of figures). The appellate court's
citations of authority justifying its conclusion were inapposite. 358
D. APPEALS
In Dawson-Austin v. Austin359 the husband asserted that the wife was
barred from taking an appeal by voluntarily accepting the benefits of the
judgment. 36° The benefits referred to by the husband were attorney's
fees (including interim fees), witnesses's transportation expenses, and
temporary alimony. The court pointed out that most of these benefits
were not included in the final judgment and that the enforcement of these
benefits was not at cross purposes to the wife's appeal from the judgment.
The court also pointed out that the husband's rights would not be
prejudiced by the wife's acceptance of those benefits nor by her pursuit of
an appeal.361
In Tschirhart v. Tschirhart362 the husband attempted to rely on values
he placed on community property in his sworn inventory and appraisal,
documents filed with the district clerk but which were not introduced into
evidence at the trial. The same issue and a similar one had been previ-
ously dealt with by other appellate courts. The Tyler Court.of Appeals in
Poulter v. Poulter3 63 had concluded that inventories are analogous to in-
terrogatories and thus must be introduced into evidence to be considered
as part of a record for appeal. The Houston First District Court of Ap-
peals had held, however, that when a trial court's conclusions refer to an
inventory not in evidence, the inventory may be considered on appeal
because the trial court evidently used it.36 4 The court in Tschirhart chose
to follow the decision of the Tyler court because its decision was more to
the point and more convincing.365 In Tschirhart the husband had also
asked the appellate court to consider certain pre-trial statements of both
parties. These were also not in evidence at trial and were not filed with
the district clerk until over six months after the trial. The appellate court
also refused to consider these statements not in evidence. 366
In Oliver v. Oliver367 the appellant had asserted that her claim for
fraud was severable from the remainder of the trial court's judgment for
divorce. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that a party may sever a
357. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 731; McKnight, 543 S.W.2d at 863.
358. Ramirez, 873 S.W.2d at 742.
359. 1995 WL 1680 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Jan. 3, 1995, n.w.h.).
360. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).
361. Dawson-Austin, 1995 WL 1680 at *1.
362. 876 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
363. 565 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-lyler 1978, no writ).
364. Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 670-71 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, writ denied).
365. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d at 508-09. In Vannerson the Houston court typified its con-
sideration of the inventory as taking judicial notice of it and the court in Tschirhart dis-
cussed judicial notice as a matter for its concern. In neither case was taking judicial notice
properly at issue.
366. Id at 509.
367. 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994). See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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claim or aspect of a dispute for the purpose of a limited appeal even
though the claim arose from a situation that the trial court interpreted in
a manner with which the appellant does not wholly dispute.368 A strict
rule against limited appeals would preclude an appeal concerning the
property division on divorce without taking an appeal on the divorce
itself.369
E. ENFORCEMENT
In Ex parte Minns370 an ex-husband had been sentenced to six months
in jail and ordered to pay a $500 fine for refusing to answer each of fifty
questions asked in a deposition hearing held for the purpose of discovery
of assets. Because the contemnor had not been afforded the protection of
a jury trial for a punishment of six months in jail, he was entitled to be
released on a writ of habeas corpus. The condemning court's reduction of
the penalty over thirty days after the judgment was signed was beyond
the court's power.371
In another case 372 the Dallas Court of Appeals granted a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the ex-wife had been invalidly imprisoned for
debt under the Texas Constitution. 373 The contemnor had been commit-
ted to jail to compel her to discharge unpaid fees of an attorney ad litem
and other court costs incurred in connection with a child visitation dis-
pute. In releasing her the court made it clear that the charges addressed
were not for child support but merely for debt.
Englert v. Englert374 addressed a point of pleading and raised some un-
resolved issues of fraudulent transfer. An ex-husband was indebted to his
former wife by a Tennessee decree for alimony, medical expenses, and
child support. The ex-wife got a Texas judgment on the arrears owed on
her Tennessee decree under the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act.375 An-
ticipating that his creditor's ex-wife might serve him with a writ of gar-
nishment for a debt owed but not yet due, the ex-husband's debtor
thereupon prepaid the obligation. As anticipated, the ex-wife then
served her writ, and the garnishee answered that he owed no debt to the
ex-husband. The trial court held that the debtor's prepayment of the debt
constituted a fraudulent transfer, and the former debtor appealed. The
368. Id. at 273.
369. The wife was not barred from asserting her right to relief, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE Ai. § 16.069 (Vernon 1986), because she had limited her appeal to the issue of
fraud and thus excluded other matters arising from the same occurrence or transaction.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 40(a)(4). In so concluding the court relied, inter alia, on Penick v. Penick,
750 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, rev'd on other grounds, 783
S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1990)(community reimbursement claim severable from child support is-
sue in divorce case).
370. 889 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
371. The court's power to modify its judgment extends for only thirty days under TEX.
R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
372. Ex pane Hightower, 877 S.W. 2d 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
373. TEx. CONsT. art I, § 18 (imprisonment for debt).
374. 881 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, n.w.h.).
375. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-35.008 (Vernon 1986).
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appellate court held that the ex-wife had not pled the fraudulent transfer
and therefore the judgment should be reversed because the judgment did
not conform to the pleadings. 3 76 But even with the foresight in pleading
called for by the appellate court, should the ex-wife have prevailed? Did
the debtor really make a fraudulent transfer? The trial court's conclusion
seems faulty as a matter of law. If a fraudulent grantee's return of prop-
erty to a fraudulent grantor is not wrongful as the Texas Supreme Court
held it was not in Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey Co. ,377 prepayment of a valid
indebtedness can scarcely be fraudulent and the provisions of the of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act enacted in 1987378 do not appear to
have changed that conclusion.
In Pearcy v. Pearcy379 an ex-wife brought suit for clarification and en-
forcement of a 1984 divorce decree that she would receive a specific per-
centage of her husband's military benefits he would receive on
retirement. As an initial showing for enforcement of such an order, the
appellate court said that the movant must demonstrate that the order
was not specific enough to be enforced by contempt.380 In the absence of
a finding of ambiguity under section 3.71,381 the appellate court held that
there is no authority to clarify the judgment.382
In Pate v. Pate383 the ex-wife sought an order to clarify a 1992 agreed
judgment for division of property on divorce. Pursuant to a settlement
agreement, the wife was awarded an interest in the husband's pension
benefits at retirement. The divorce decree gave the wife one half of a
fraction of the husband's retirements benefits: the number of months of
the husband's accrued benefits during marriage divided by the total
number of months of his past and future months of employment. In re-
sponse to the ex-wife's motion for clarification, the trial court concluded
that it was the parties' intent merely to make an equal division of the
value of their community interest between them. The appellate court
held, however, that the ex-wife had failed to discharge her burden of
proof that there had been a mutual mistake and, therefore, that the trial
court had erred in changing the express terms of the prior decree.38 The
appellate court also held the agreement provided that the ex-wife be paid
when the ex-husband would be paid on retirement and that she was not
allowed to choose to be paid at his earliest retirement date.38 5 Thus, re-
tirement would be determined as the ex-husband and the company would
decide. At trial the ex-wife had not been the successful party and attor-
376. Englert, 881 S.W.2d at 520.
377. 42 S.W. 963 (Tex. 1897).
378. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-24.012 (Vernon 1987).
379. 884 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, n.w.h.).
380. Id
381. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.71 (Vernon 1992).
382. Pearcy, 884 S.W.2d at 514.
383. 874 S.W.2d 286 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).




ney's fees were denied. As she was successful on appeal, the trial court
was directed to consider an award of attorney's fees under section 3.77.386
F. OTHER POST DIVORCE DISPUTES
In a 1968 divorce decree that provided the impetus for the dispute in
Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat,387 the court made no division of the husband's interest
in a non-military pension plan. In 1992 the ex-wife sought a partition 388
of the undivided community portion of the retirement benefits already
distributed since 1978 and the benefits to be distributed. There was no
dispute as to those amounts. The trial court awarded the ex-wife a money
judgment for her community share of the benefits already paid, ordered
the ex-husband to acquire a life insurance policy with the ex-wife as bene-
ficiary as security for payment, partitioned future benefits betwen the ex-
spouses, and termed the ex-husband a constructive trustee of the ex-
wife's portion of benefits to be received on her behalf. On appeal the
principal issue in dispute was the trial court's sua sponte requirement of
security for payment of the judgment. Without commenting on the pro-
priety of such a requirement for this or other purposes, the appellate
court held that the order was improper when unsupported by any evi-
dence of the insurability of the ex-husband or the amount of the premium
required for such a policy.389
Walton v. Johnson390 also turned on a dispute concerning property un-
divided on divorce. Because the property at issue had not been before
the divorce court for division, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel were inapplicable and a summary judgment awarded to the ex-
husband on those grounds was improper.391
In seeking damages for breach of a property settlement agreement in
In re Brown,392 the ex-husband asserted that by the agreement his ex-wife
had barred her right to seek a partition of Oklahoma realty owned by the
parties. But the agreement had not so specified, and even if it had, the
court said such an agreement would have been contrary to the policy-rule
that the right of partition should be maintained "as an absolute right. 3
93
At the time of the ex-husband's action, the property had been partitioned
by a final judgment of an Oklahoma court and appealed by the ex-hus-
386. Id.
387. 886 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994).
388. Although the appellate court referred to this as an equitable proceeding under
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.91 (Vernon 1992), the time had long passed since the court
might have made a "just and right" division of the benefits.
389. Jeffcoat, 886 S.W.2d at 569.
390. 879 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, n.w.h.).
391. Id. at 945-46. Although the ex-wife was successful in showing that her proof at
trial justified the summary judgment granted in her favor as to the separate nature of cer-
tain mineral interests, id. at 947, she was unsuccessful in showing that her summary judg-
ment proof demonstrated the separate character of particular bank accounts by tracing
them from the asserted source of her father's estate. Id. at 946-47.
392. 870 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
393. Id. at 604 (citing Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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band to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Any dispute with respect to
the partition was, therefore, before the Oklahoma court and was res
judicata.394
Scalfani v. Scalfani395 was a procedural skirmish in a post divorce effort
to sell realty apparently before the court but left undivided in a 1979 di-
vorce decree. In 1986 the ex-wife petitioned for appointment of a re-
ceiver to sell the property with the result that the ex-spouses agreed to
sell the property, but no sale resulted. A year later the ex-wife again
sought the appointment of a receiver and one was appointed to sell the
property. Again no sale resulted. In 1990 a substitute receiver was ap-
pointed in response to the ex-wife's motion. In 1991 the ex-wife sought a
replacement of the receiver without success. In 1993 the ex-husband
moved to set aside the receivership on the ground that appointment of
the receiver changed the terms of the 1979 decree concerning sale of the
property. When his motion was overruled, the ex-husband promptly ap-
pealed. The majority of the appellate court held that an appeal of the
appointment of a receiver must be taken within twenty days of the origi-
nal order of appointment 396 and thus that any right to appeal had expired
over five years before.397 The court pointed out that the ex-husband had
not sought to terminate the receivership but to set aside the appoint-
ment.3 98 In her dissent, Justice Mirabal saw the ex-husband's motion as
one "to vacate the receivership" by which she presumably meant to ter-
minate it.3 99
In re Group Life Insurance Proceeds of Mallory400 dealt with a benefi-
ciary designation of a life insurance policy of a deceased ex-husband.
During marriage, the husband named his wife as primary beneficiary and
two of her daughters by a prior marriage as alternate beneficiaries. After
his divorce, the insured did not change the beneficiary designations.
Although the designation of the primary beneficiary did not survive the
divorce, 401 the designations of the alternate beneficiaries were unaffected
by the provisions of Family Code section 3.623.402 Whether the statute
should be amended to provide otherwise with respect to insurance desig-
nations in favor of relatives of a divorced spouse should be carefully
considered.
Stephens v. Stephens403 concerned a joint, contractual will made by a
married couple in 1986 in favor of the survivor. After both parties had
filed for divorce in 1990, the husband with his wife's knowledge made a
new will of his separate property and his share of the community estate
394. Brown, 870 S.W.2d at 604-05.
395. 870 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1993, no writ).
396. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
397. Scalfani, 870 S.W.2d at 611.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 613 (Mirabel, J., dissenting).
400. 872 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
401. Id. at 801.
402. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.623 (Vernon 1992).
403. 877 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
1270 [Vol. 48
HUSBAND AND WIFE
for the benefit of his children. The husband died several months later
and no divorce was granted. In a contest between the beneficiaries of the
two wills, the probate court admitted the second will to probate and re-
fused to impose a constructive trust on the beneficiaries of the second will
in favor of the beneficiary under the first will. The parties stipulated that
the divorce would have been granted if the husband had lived a little
longer. Section 59A(b) of the Probate Code 4°4 provides that "a joint or
reciprocal will does not by itself suffice as evidence of the existence of a
contract," 40 5 but such a will may nonetheless be contractual, as this will
evidently was. Either party may revoke a will shown to be contractual
but may be answerable for any loss suffered by the other party.406 The
court responded to this rule by saying that the consideration for the 1986
contract had failed and that the wife had not changed her position in
reliance on the 1986 will. Hence, the revocation of the will did not con-
stitute a breach of the couple's contract or amount to fraud on the wife's
interest under the contractual will in these circumstances. Had the results
been otherwise, the court seems to conclude that imposition of a con-
structive trust is the survivor's sole remedy in such a situation. 40 7 The
court went on to say that its judgment in this case is limited to its facts:
that but for the death of the husband, the divorce would have been
granted with the result that all provisions of the first will in favor of the
wife would have been avoided.408 The court nevertheless concluded (as it
may be asserted in comparable situations) 40 9 that a divorcing spouse loses
all benefits of a contractual will made with the other spouse unless detri-
mental reliance on the terms of the will can be proved.
Following a divorce, the ex-husband brought suit against his ex-wife's
attorney for causes that were adjudged groundless and merely for the
purpose of harassment. The attorney represented herself in the proceed-
ing and was awarded attorney's fees as sanctions against the plaintiff for
the time she expended in defending herself. In Beasley v. Peters410 the
Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed the award and remanded the case
for the imposition of an appropriate sanction. In ruling against the
award of the attorney's fees to an attorney pro se the court said that in
using the term "attorney's fees" in Rule 215(2)(b)(8) 411 the rulemaker
likely contemplated "an attorney-client relationship;" 412 therefore, a pro
se litigant is not entitled to fees under the rule.413
404. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(b) (Vernon 1980).
405. Id.
406. Stephens, 877 S.W.2d at 804.
407. Id. at 805.
408. Id. citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1980).
409. See Garrison v. Garrison, 568 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no
writ)(citing Garrison v. Mead, 553 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977,
no writ); Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1977, no writ)).
410. 870 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
411. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(8).




G. EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code 414 exempts alimony for an
ex-spouse and child support from the discharge of the payor.415 In his
bankruptcy in In re Johnson416 the ex-husband asserted that monthly pay-
ments for his ex-wife providing for alimony and support in an agreement
incorporated in their divorce decree actually constituted repayment of
debts and therefore were dischargeable. The ex-wife admitted that in
reaching the agreement to be paid $400,000 over a period of ten years,
she took into account a loan for $85,000 secured by her separate property
(or what the court called bienes separados under the law of the parties'
Mexican domicile) and expended for their living expenses during the
marriage.417 The court nevertheless gave great weight to the intention of
the parties at divorce in characterizing their agreement as for "alimony",
thus avoiding for the court what it described as "a parol evidence prob-
lem."'418 Hence, the ex-wife had discharged her burden of proving that
the payments were for "alimony" and nondischargeable. In concluding
that the agreement was indeed for alimony, the court also relied on the
fact that the parties had little community property to divide but failed to
note that a right of reimbursement was in issue.419 The court, however,
denied an award of the ex-wife's attorney's fees as not an obligation of
the bankrupt's estate and not anticipated by the agreement. 420
A different issue with respect to attorney's fees was before the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Joseph.421 In this case the wife's attor-
ney had received a judgment for his fees against the husband and the wife
for his representation of the wife to enforce a temporary support award.
In the ex-husband's subsequent bankruptcy the attorney sought a decla-
ration that the bankrupt's obligation to pay the judgment was not dis-
chargeable. The appellate court affirmed the district court's affirmance
of the bankruptcy court's opinion that the judgment for attorney's fees
actually "formed part of an overall economic arrangement to provide [the
wife] with needed support" and was therefore nondischargeable.4 22
414. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
415. To give greater protection to alimony and child-support provisions in bankruptcy,
11 U.S.C. § 507(a) was amended in 1994 to give a seventh priority to such provisions. On
the other hand, the 1994 amendments also provided an exception to the rule against dis-
charge of alimony and child support obligations when the debtor lacks the ability to pay
and "discharging the debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detri-
mental consequences" to the payee. It is not clear when this provision will apply. See Act
of Oct. 22, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. I, § 108(c), tit. II, § 207, tit. III, § 304(o), tit. V,
§ 501 (b)(3), (d)(1l), 108 Stat. 4112, 4123, 4142, 4145.
416. 162 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
417. Id. at 136.
418. Id. at 134.
419. Even more dubiously, of course, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals treated a right
of reimbursement as an element of "alimony substitute" for bankruptcy purposes in In re
Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
420. Id.
421. 16 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1994).
422. Id. at 87.
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In Farrey v. Sanderfoot423 and Owen v. Owen424 the United States
Supreme Court drew a nice line between the situations425 when liens may
or may not be removed from a homestead and exempt personalty under
section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.426 In the 1994 Bankruptcy Code
amendments, Congress left the language of the Code in place that sup-
ported the prior judicial distinction but Congress excluded judicial liens
securing alimony and child-support from the scope of the bankrupt's right
of avoidance 427 "to supplement the reach of Farrey v. Sanderfoot."428 In
a Texas context it is difficult to see how Farrey will be supplemented by
the amendment.
Section 522(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 429 which was not amended
in 1994, provides that property claimed by a bankrupt debtor as exempt is
not liable for pre-petition debts except for certain nondischargeable tax
and family support obligations. The ex-wife of the debtor in In re Da-
vis430 sought to turn this essentially defensive provision to an offensive
purpose by arguing that by way of federal preemption a creditor with a
claim for family support may achieve access to exempt property in bank-
ruptcy. In her ex-husband's bankruptcy proceeding, the ex-wife moved
for an order that the federal marshal seize and sell the debtor's home-
stead under the Texas turnover statute 43' in order to satisfy support obli-
gations under state law. In brief, her argument seems to have been that
the Texas statute is designed to reach property that "cannot readily be
attached or levied on by ordinary legal process"432 and that the bank-
ruptcy process affords the means.433 Her effort failed. The bankruptcy
court held that section 522(c)(1) does not create liability:
While it does not impose an injunction against liability on exempt
property for [section] 523(a)(1) or (a)(5) debts, it also does not pre-
vent non-bankruptcy law from imposing such an injunction. Indeed,
Texas has done so.... Rather than affirmatively subjecting exempt
property to liability for family support obligations, Congress did not
extend the injunction against liability for family support obligation.
This permits states like Texas to enact broader injunctions of liability
of exempt property, protecting exempt property even from non-dis-
charged family support obligation.434
423. 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
424. 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
425. See Farrey, 500 U.S. at 291; Owen, 500 U.S. at 305, discussed in McKnight, 1992
Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 1854-55.
426. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
427. Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat. 4142 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(1)
(West Supp. 1995)). The meaning of the amendment is obscure, especially
§ 522(f)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
428. H.R. REP. No. 835, supra note 237, at 54.
429. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (1988).
430. 170 B.R. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
431. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986).
432. Davis, 170 B.R. at 894.
433. Id.
434. Id at 898.
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Prior to her husband's bankruptcy filings for himself and his two
wholly-owned separate corporations that may be referred to collectively
as In re Share International, Inc.,435 the wife filed for divorce and joined
as parties the corporations as his alter egos. The divorce court divided
the community estate, awarded the wife money judgments against the
husband and one of the corporations, and fixed liens on realty and per-
sonalty of the husband and both corporations as security for the judg-
ments. Unable to file a bond in the amounts necessary to supersede the
judgment for appeal, two weeks after the rendition of the final judgment
the husband and the two corporations filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 436 On motions by the ex-wife and
the United States Trustee, the bankruptcy court suspended the three re-
organization cases with the observation that court would not sit as a court
of appeals in a divorce case.437 The ex-husband was ordered to pay all
fees of the proceedings. 438
435. In re Share Int'l, Inc., In re Parker Chiropractic Resource Found., Inc., and In re
Parker, 8 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 245 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
436. 11 U.S.C. 1101-1109 (1988).
437. Share International, 8 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. at 247 (citing In re Little Creek Devel-
opment Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986)).
438. Id. at 248.
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